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2
Introduction
Over the past decades the population has changed a lot. Due to to many cir-
cumstances such as technological and economic growth or progress in medical
sciences, people live much longer nowadays. This brings up many challenges
for the current society. One of them being the problem of pension systems.
This thesis aims at bringing contribution to the discussion about pension
system reform by exploring the theoretical basis of the reform and identifying
problems in the reform implementation. There are three main topics of this
thesis:
• Problem identification
• Theory presentation
• Solution implementation
Firstly, in chapters 1,2, we identify the problem. We define objectives
of pension systems, classify the most important types of pension systems,
and show how they work. We present also the basic way how to model
a pension system and point out the main risks of different pension system
types. Afterwards, we take the Czech Republic as an example of a country
experiencing difficulties with pension system. We describe the evolution of
the Czech system and show what are the main problems and how will they
evolve in the near future. At the end of Chapter 2 we present main reasons
for the reform.
Secondly, in chapters 3,4, we present the theoretical background of the
pension system reform. We discuss the Pareto efficiency problem and present
conditions under which the pension system reform might be Pareto-efficient.
We also outline the political economy of the reform. Using a study describing
the reform implementation in Latin America and transition economies, we
identify the most crucial variables, such as pre-existing conditions or influence
groups, which have an impact on the possible success of the reform.
Thirdly, in chapters 5,6, we investigate practical problems of reforming
a pension system. In Chapter 5 we use examples from the CEE region -
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Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and we evaluate their reforms. We identify
the most crucial mistakes that were made and draw lessons out of them.
These lessons have to be followed if the pension system reform in the Czech
Republic should be successful. Finally, we discuss the current Czech reform
and main objections against it. At the very end of Chapter 6 we evaluate the
Czech reform and predict how the new system will work in the near future.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Pension
Systems
In this introductory chapter we start with the main objectives of pension
systems and reasons of their existence. Then we introduce basic concepts of
different pension systems and economic tools which are used to model this
environment, the so called overlapping generations models (OLG models).
This we use later when analysing different pension schemes and the transition
between them. At the end of this chapter we mention various risks the
different pension schemes face.
1.1 Objectives of Pension Systems
Individuals are not economically active lifelong and therefore they have to
secure an income after they retire. This could be essentially done on a private
basis without any state intervention. Individuals could save or invest part
of their income while they are economically active in order to use when they
are older.
The problem one faces when deciding how much should one save or invest
during his active years in order to be able to consume in retirement is caused
by many uncertainties in the real world. First uncertainty is how long one is
going to live. Living too long could cause outliving one’s savings. This can
be solved by an insurance provided by a private company, because although
it is almost impossible to predict longevity of a particular individual, the
prediction of longevity of a sufficiently large group of people is much eas-
ier. Such private company can than provide insured people with annuities
knowing the average life expectancy.
In a simple world this setting would be sufficient without any need of gov-
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ernment intervention. Barr and Diamond (2006) identify two sets of reasons
why this approach is insufficient in the real world. The first set of reasons
consists of existence of many imperfections, such as imperfect information,
missing markets or numerous distortions in the economy. The second set
consists of other government’s objectives which could be easily accomplished
through the pension system, such as fighting poverty or redistribution. An
example of fighting poverty would be paying pensions to those people who
were not able to safe enough for their retirement. This could be also an
example of redistribution. However, we can find redistribution which is not
primarily poverty fighting such as redistribution towards married couples
with children or towards war veterans.
As a result, pension system is nowadays a very complicated multi-purpose
framework which influences the whole economy. Therefore its setting is cru-
cial.
1.2 Classification of Pension Systems
Because the problem of shifting wealth (consumption) from one’s productive
middle age to one’s higher age has to been solved in every society, some type
of pension system exists in every country. In this section we would like to
define the most common schemes.
1.2.1 Public and Private Pension Systems
As mentioned above the main purpose of a pension system is to ensure con-
sumption smoothing. This could be done both on public or private basis.
In developed economies people usually finance their consumption at higher
age from both systems (pillars1). Nevertheless the proportion of public and
private system differs substantially among different countries.
The public pension system is usually state-organized, i.e. the state is
responsible for both contribution collection and pension payments. This
system is in most countries mandatory. Main reasons for this is individual
myopia and possible insurance market failures. We distinguish two types of
state-organized pensions (often a state pension consists of both types):
• Flat-rate pension - every pensioner is provided with an equal pension
independent of former income.
1If there are more systems from which people get pensions from we refer to these
systems as to pillars. A pension system mostly have several pillars.
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• Earnings-related pension - every pensioner is provided with a pension
which is related to former income (usually a minimum pension is defined
here).
According to Bezdeˇk (2000a), all OECD countries except from Australia, Ire-
land, the Netherlands, and New Zealand have some type of earnings-related
pension, using usually defined-benefit pay-as-you-go schemes (see later).
On the other hand, in most countries there exists a possibility to use
a private pillar, which is very often subsidized from the government. This
pillar can be organized in many ways:
• Private pension funds : these funds are usually under strict governmen-
tal supervision and are usually allowed to invest mainly into low-risk
assets such as government bonds. These funds administer individual
pension accounts, i.e. the future payments are related to former sav-
ings, and insured people are provided either with an annuity when they
retire or they are allowed to withdraw the whole amount at once.
• Employer-sponsored occupational scheme: depending on a country these
schemes are administered either directly by employers, or could be or-
ganized by financial institutions in case of small enterprises, or on the
other hand, could be organized jointly on professional basis. Employer-
sponsored occupational schemes are historically much older than any
other type of the private pillar.
• Other possibilities : such as personal savings or individual life insurance.
The first two saving schemes in private pillar can be both mandatory
or voluntary, the third one (personal savings, individual life insurance) is
voluntary.
1.2.2 Defined-contribution and Defined-benefit Schemes
Before discussing the differences between the pay-as-you-go system and the
funded system we introduce another classification of pension systems which
describes how closely the benefits of the system are related to one’s previous
contributions. We distinguish following approaches:
• Defined-contribution scheme
• Defined-benefit scheme
• Notional defined-contribution scheme
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In a defined-contribution scheme (DC scheme) insured persons pay fixed
contribution, usually a fixed fraction of their income. The benefit they get
when they retire is not guaranteed and depends, for example in case of private
pension funds, on the return on investment. Therefore the possible benefit
from this scheme can vary a lot.
On the other hand, in a defined-benefit scheme (DB scheme) one has
a guaranteed future pension, generally a fixed fraction of former income,
the so-called replacement ratio. The formula used to compute the pension
can take into account not only the former income throughout the whole
productive years, but also the highest former income or the last income one
had before one retired. Sometimes it takes into account the length of the
service as well. Although in this scheme people pay a regular contribution
which is usually defined as a fraction of income, like in the DC scheme, the
crucial difference is that here the sponsor (which could be the state or the
employer, for instance) ensures that the insured persons get their guaranteed
benefit after they retire. In other words, the sponsor’s contribution ensures
the balance of the DB scheme and he is the one who takes the risk.
The last approach is the notional defined-contribution scheme (NDC scheme).
This scheme mimics the DC scheme insofar as it pretends every person had
an individual account, even though these accounts are fictive and do not
match any real funds. This scheme is used in pay-as-you-go schemes and
each contributor pays a fixed fraction of his income as a contribution which
is credited to his fictive personal account. This account pays a notional in-
terest which is set up by the government (the notional interest rate does not
equal the market interest rate). When one retires, the account balance is
converted into an annuity.
We would like to point out that both the DC scheme and the NDC scheme
could incorporate some redistribution for example through determining a
minimal guaranteed pension.
1.2.3 PAYG and FF Schemes
Speaking about pension systems and pension system reform, the essential
division is the one between a pay-as-you-go scheme (PAYG scheme) and
a fully funded scheme (FF scheme). We will start with introducing both
extreme cases and, later on, show that in reality a middle approach is often
taken.
A PAYG scheme is based on intergenerational solidarity and is usually
run by the state (although we can find PAYG schemes run by employers).
In this scheme, the current retired population receives pensions which are
paid from contributions of the current working population. This scheme has
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to be mandatory in order to safeguard future payments, i.e. to be able to
promise future pensions for the current working population. There are no
investments in this scheme and it works fully on a redistributional basis.
In a FF scheme, on the other hand, contributions of current working
population are invested into assets and the return on these is credited to
one’s personal account. In retirement, the insured persons are paid either
an annuity or some other way of payment is used (sometimes a one-time
withdrawal is possible). In this scheme there is no redistribution and one’s
pension fully depends on one’s savings. The FF scheme is the most usual
scheme used in private superannuation schemes, however, it is sometimes
used also in public schemes.
The FF scheme is a DC scheme, i.e. there is a defined contribution one has
to pay, but the benefit is not guaranteed and depends on many exogenous
variables such as the rate of return. The pure PAYG scheme is, on the
other hand, a DB scheme, because pensions are guaranteed as far as the
legislation is not changed. Nevertheless the PAYG scheme can be organized
as a NDC scheme and than there is no strict guarantee of the future pension
amount either.
1.3 Simple Model of a Pension System
After defining the most important divisions among pension schemes we would
like to point out the main characteristics of the PAYG and FF schemes,
some of which we will analyse more thoroughly in the next chapters. We
will start with introducing the way how a pension system is modelled using
an OLG model. In this subsection we start with a simplified one, just to be
able to show the main differences between a PAYG and a FF scheme (see
Rosner 2003 or Ribhegge 1999).
In this OLG model people live for two periods. In the first period they
work, in the second they just consume (using only savings they have made
in the first period in case there is no public pension system). In each period
there are only two generations alive - one is working and one is retired. We
will assume everybody dies at the same age having consumed all his savings,
i.e. leaving no bequests.
Let’s start with a PAYG scheme. In this scheme contributions have to
equal pensions in every period t:2
Nwt Wtbt = N
r
t Pt, (1.1)
2We assume here that the pension system is balanced and it does not have to be
subsidized from other taxes.
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where Nwt and N
r
t stand for the working population and for the retired pop-
ulation in the period t, respectively. Wt is the real wage, bt the rate of
contribution and Pt the pension paid in the period t.
Let’s assume the population is constantly growing at rate n and the real
wage is constantly growing at rate w:
Nwt+1 = (1 + n)N
w
t ,
Wt+1 = (1 + w)Wt.
Now we can define a rate of return i of the PAYG scheme as follows:3
1 + i =
Pt+1
Pt
= (1 + n) (1 + w)
bt+1
bt
. (1.2)
From this equation we see that if we keep the rate of contribution bt constant,
we have i ≈ n + w, for low enough values of n and w. In other words each
generation gets approximately (n+ w)-times more on pensions than they
have paid on contributions.
In the case of the FF scheme the rate of return equals the rate of interest r.
Each generation invests a fraction bt of its income Wt and gets in the next
period the pension Pt+1:
Pt+1 = (1 + r)Wtbt.
Therefore, if we want to decide which pension scheme is more suitable we
compare rates of returns of both schemes. Aaron’s condition (Aaron 1966)
states if
n+ w > r (1.3)
the PAYG scheme is to be preferred. However, in the long term, according
to the macroeconomic theory we should have an equality, i.e. n+ w = r.
This result does not mean, because of the transformation costs, that
whenever n+w > r holds or vice versa we should change the pension scheme
accordingly. We will discuss this matter in detail in Chapter 3.
1.4 Various Risks For Pension Systems
In the Section 1.1 we have mentioned possible risks one faces when securing
an income for the retirement. In this section we would like to specify these
risks and discuss them with relation to the PAYG and to the FF scheme.
From the following text it will also be clear why a multi-pillar system is
3This rate of return is only imaginary as far as there is no real interest payment.
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recommended in order to minimize every possible risk.4 According to Bo¨rsch-
Supan and Reil Held (1997) and Holzmann (1997) we discuss the following
risks: political, demographic, family, longevity and macroeconomic risks.
1.4.1 Political Risks
With a political risk we mean those political actions which can substan-
tially change the amount of future pensions. Neither of these two schemes
is resistant to this risk. A legislation can be easily changed which affects
both schemes. We are experiencing, for example, continual small parametric
changes of PAYG schemes in many countries which directly influence current
pensions. As an example of this we can mention abolishing the minimum
replacement rate in Austria in 1984 which substantially decreased women’s
pensions (Rosner 2003).
Table 1.1: Pensions in Austria
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Pension of women
as percentage 58.8 59.0 56.4 51.7 49.7 49.4 49.1 50.2
of pension of men
Source: Rosner (2003).
Pension funds, on the other hand, may be misused or in extreme cases
nationalized - recall the very recent Hungarian case. It is assumed that
political risk is bigger in case of PAYG schemes, because goals of governments
(and governments themselves) are constantly changing. These political risks
are much smaller in case of pension funds as far as in developed countries
the property rights are guaranteed.
4The World Bank recommends a five pillar framework with following pillars: a
non-contributory zero pillar to ensure a protection against poverty (for example a
flat-rate pension); a mandatory first pillar based on a PAYG scheme; a manda-
tory second pillar based on an individual savings account (FF scheme); a voluntary
third pillar taking all possible forms such as individual savings or employer-sponsored
scheme; a non-financial fourth pillar such as family support, social programs or as-
sets such as house ownership. See The World Bank Pension Conceptual Frame-
work, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPENSIONS/Resources/395443-
1121194657824/PRPNoteConcept Sept2008.pdf.pdf.
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1.4.2 Demographic Risks
The demographic risk is nowadays very often discussed and is often used
by politicians to give a reason why the transition from a PAYG scheme to
a FF scheme (or to a mixed scheme) is inevitable. Although this opinion
is in political discussions often not doubted at all, economists have shown
that the transition from a PAYG to a FF scheme does not solve the adverse
demographic problem.
As Barr (2000) argues, we can show this as follows. In the first case, we
assume the real output is staying the same despite of the adverse demographic
development. Let’s assume the generation t is twice as big as the following
generation t + 1, but the output does not change and hence the real per
capita wage doubles, i.e. Wt+1 = 2Wt. Recalling the equation describing the
PAYG scheme from previous section
Nwt Wtbt = N
r
t Pt,
we see that in this case, in spite of lowering the replacement ratio Pt
Wt
, the real
pension Pt stays the same. This case does not pose any risk to a FF scheme
either because higher per capita output (and higher real wages) ensures that
the demand of the current working population for assets stays the same and
therefore the current pensioners have real pensions they expected.
The problem arises when the output growth does not offset the adverse
demographic development. Let’s assume again that Nt = 2Nt+1, with the
overall output staying the same Wt = Wt+1. From the equation describing
the PAYG scheme we see that either the future pension has to be halved
Pt+1 =
Pt
2
or the contribution rate has to be doubled bt+1 = 2bt, in order to
keep the pension level the same Pt+1 = Pt. Both policies are not sustainable
in long-term since they would lead at the end to having no public pensions
at all.
Unfortunately, this problem cannot be directly solved by transforming
the PAYG scheme into a FF scheme, because supply of assets the current old
generation would like to sell in order to finance its consumption exceeds the
demand of the smaller current working population. Therefore the future real
pension is also under the funded scheme considerably lower than expected
(due to higher prices and/or lower rate of interest - capital is less scarce with
respect to the working force).
As we have shown, the problem lies not in demographic, but in the low
output: “PAYG and funding are both mechanisms for organizing claims on
future output; since demographic change generally affects that output, it gen-
erally causes problems for pension schemes, however they are organized. [...]
12
The solution to population ageing lies not in funding per se but in output
growth.” (Barr and Diamond (2006)).
1.4.3 Longevity Risks
The longevity risk has been already mentioned. Everybody faces a risk
of living too long and outliving one’s savings. This risk does not exist in
PAYG schemes at all. In a FF scheme where one is paid an annuity, on the
other hand, there is a moral hazard and an adverse selection problem.
An individual faces a moral hazard because he can, to a certain extend,
influence how long he is going to live (e.g. people with a healthy life style
live longer). Unfortunately the seller of the annuity (an insurance company)
knows only the average longevity and therefore offers an annuity based on
information it has about the whole generation and not about the particular
individual.
The second risk (adverse selection problem) refers to the fact that people
with shorter expected longevity are not going to buy annuity based on average
longevity. Because of this, the expected longevity of those willing to buy an
annuity is higher and therefore insurance companies have to adjust (raise)
the price of the annuity. After that also the expected average longevity of
those willing to buy the new annuity raises and the insurance company has to
adjust the price once more. This goes ad infinitum. Theoretically this could
lead, as Bezdeˇk (2000a) points out, to a situation where there is nobody
offering annuities.5 This problem could be solved by a compulsory purchase
of an annuity for all insured persons.
1.4.4 Macroeconomic Risks
There are various kinds of macroeconomic risks. Generally speaking, FF schemes
are much more subject to these risks because of their nature. One of the most
discussed are the capital market risks (variation in the rate of return, inflation
or exchange rate fluctuations). These risks can be mitigated by investing into
low risk assets, inflation-indexed bonds or into assets in the same currency
area where we want to consume later it the retirement.
Another possible macroeconomic risks are negative output shocks or un-
employment. Also these risks are bigger for a FF than for a PAYG scheme.
In case of a negative output shock, an unfunded system could be exposed to
5On the other hand Brown (2002) shows that based on utility even for low-income
groups buying an annuity is favourable if the administrative cost are sufficiently low. This
is due to the fact that the threat of outliving one’s savings is severe, even though the
probability might be low.
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lower revenues, but impacts on individuals can be mitigated. As well as in
the case of unemployment where it leads to lower contributions to the sys-
tem, but in the short-term the pension system can be subsidized from other
taxes.
As the last note, we would only like to point out that even though these
risks influence the funded scheme much more than the unfunded scheme
these risks can be in contrast to the main risks of the unfounded scheme
(e.g. political risks) diversified. One can invest in different assets in different
currencies, but in the PAYG scheme one cannot mitigate the political risk,
for example.
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Chapter 2
Pension System in the Czech
Republic
In the previous chapter we have defined the basic concepts of pension schemes.
In this chapter we introduce the pension system in the Czech Republic and
argue why a reform is necessary.
2.1 Historical Overview
In the description of the Czech pension system we start with a very short
overview of its history (Mu¨ller 2000). Like in other countries the first pension
system in the territory of the present Czech Republic was intended only for
civil servants (started in 1771). Afterwards other professional groups were
also slowly granted a pension scheme: miners in 1854, manual workers in
1906. In 1924 the Manual Workers’ Social Insurance Act established the
fourth pension scheme providing all employed people with an old-age pen-
sion. This pension system was a FF scheme, financed both by employers and
employees and a state subvention is provided. Pensions had a flat-rate basis
and a earnings-related part. It is worth noting that in those days pensioners
became their pensions first at the age of 65. The last notable change before
the World War II was the foundation of the fifth scheme in 1929, providing
means-tested pensions which were tax financed.
After communists taking the power in 1948 the National Insurance Act
was introduced putting a PAYG scheme into practice. The pension system
was part of the state budget and from the year 1952 onwards it has been
financed through a wage tax. There were three groups of workers according
to the importance of the sector they work in for the state, each group get-
ting a different pension (advantaging workers in heavy industry). In 1956
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the age of retirement was lowered to 60 (55) for men (women) and in 1964
the age of retirement for women was linked to the number of children - 53
years for women with five children or more, 57 years for women without chil-
dren. Apart from this there were not many changes of the system during the
communist era.
After the velvet revolution in 1989 no big pensions system reform took
place. In 1990 the Czech Social Security Administration (CˇSSZ, Cˇeska´ spra´va
socia´ln´ıho zabezpecˇen´ı) was founded as a part of the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs which was responsible for the pension system administration.
The state pension persists to be a PAYG scheme. Contributions are paid
by both employers and employees. The pension system was extended to cover
also the self-employed and the system was made homogeneous by cancella-
tion of former professional privileges, such as for example those for miners,
and it relates benefits more closely to previous earnings and the length of
the contributory period. In 1991 the Pension Act introduced the pension
indexation to the retail price index (during the communist era there was no
indexation). In 1994 the existence of private pension funds was enabled. The
participation in these funds was voluntary and state subsidized.
2.2 Current Pension System
In order to be able to discuss the pension system reform in the Czech Re-
public, we have to firstly describe the current system and offer predictions
about most important variables influencing it. We start with the description
in this section and the prognosis will follow in the next section.1
2.2.1 Mandatory PAYG Scheme
The Czech pension system has nowadays (in year 2011) two pillars. The first
pillar is a mandatory public PAYG scheme which covers almost the whole
population and which is uniform (there are no special schemes for differ-
ent professions). The second pillar is a voluntary private state-subsidized
FF scheme. The public scheme offers four types of pensions:
• Old-age pensions - 74% of total pension system expenditure in 2009,2
• Disability pensions - 18%,
1The information about the current pension system is taken from the Ministry of
Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, http://www.mpsv.cz.
2Source: Czech Statistical Office (CZSO), http://www.czso.cz.
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• Survivors’ and Children’s pensions - 8%.
Our main focus in this thesis is of course on the old-age pension. The
contribution rate into the public scheme is now 28% of the gross wage (6.5%
is paid by the employee himself and 21.5% is paid by the employer).
Originally one received the regular old-age pension if one has contributed
into the system at least for 25 years and has reached the age of retirement
or has contributed for 15 years and was 65 years old. The age of retirement
is nowadays 62 years for men and 55-60 years for women depending on how
many children they have raised. Women are retiring one year earlier for each
child raised, i.e. at the age of 60 in case they had no children and at the age
of 55 in case they have raised 5 children or more).
But these system parameters are continuously being changed and in 2018
the mandatory contribution period into the system in order to qualify for
the regular old-age pension will be 35 years and reaching the retirement age
or 20 years but being 5 years older than the retirement age. The retirement
age is also being continuously increased and in 2033 it should be 65 years for
men and 62-65 years for women (64 if they have raised 2, 63 if 3 and 62 if
4 or more children). There also exists a possibility for earlier retirement in
case one has contributed at least for 25 years to the system and one is not
more than 3 years younger than the official retirement age (for those whose
retirement age is above 65 years this condition is extended to 5 years). In
the case of earlier retirement the pension is lowered.
The current old-age pension consists of two components, a flat-rate and an
earnings-related component. The flat-rate component is 2,170 CZK and the
earnings-related component at least 770 CZK per month (the current living
wage in the Czech Republic is 2,020 CZK). The earnings-related component is
influenced not only by one’s income, but also by the contribution period. The
current average old-age pension (the second quarter of 2010) is 9,839 CZK3
which is 42% of the current average gross wage. This ratio between old-age
pensions and wages is decreasing in long term as shown in the following table
(we have experienced a reverse trend in last years because of the economic
crisis which has influenced wages, but not old-age pensions):
3Source: CZSO.
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Figure 2.1: Relationship between pensions and wages
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Source: CZSO, own computations.
In order to secure certain living standards for pensioners pensions are
automatically annually valorized. Only in the case when annual inflation
rate is below 2% or above 5% a special approach is taken.
The goal of securing certain living standards is accomplished as the ratio
of retired people under the poverty threshold is smaller than it is in the whole
population. Below the threshold of 60% of median income there is 8% of the
whole population, but only 4% of those older than 60 years, 4.4% of those
older than 65 years and 6.6% of those older than 75 years.4
2.2.2 Voluntary FF Scheme
As mentioned above, since 1994 the existence of private pension funds (FF,
DC scheme) was enabled. This scheme is opened to everybody older than
18 years, who has a permanent residence either in the Czech Republic or in
any EU member state and is contributing either to the public pension system
or to the public health insurance system. Every person, once he decides to
participate on this pension scheme, is obliged to contribute at least 100 CZK
per month. The state subsidy is at least 50 CZK and at most 150 CZK
per month (in case one contributes more than 500 CZK per month). These
4National Strategy Report on Adequate and Sustainable Pensions (2005).
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contributions can also be paid by the employer. Another form of subsidy of
this pension scheme is a tax relief and a relief on pension system and health
insurance contribution for its contributors.
At this moment (year 2011) there are 10 private pension funds which are
regulated by the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic. This pillar is
widely used and at the end of the year 2009, 4,447,252 persons were partic-
ipating. This makes 58% of the population in productive age. The average
annual per capita contribution in 2009 was slightly bellow 9,500 CZK with
the following average distribution of sources of contributions:
Figure 2.2: Distribution of contributions into private pension funds
66%
20%
14%
Contributions from individuals
Contributions from employers
State subsidy
Source: CZSO, own computations.
If we express the individual private pension fund contribution in terms
of average wage we get that people save within pension funds in long term
approximately 2% of their income.5 This amount is considered as too low in
order to generate decent future pension and it will be shown later why and
how people should be motivated to save more.
Pension funds in the Czech Republic are investing mainly in bonds - 84%
(out of which 83% are government bonds), to a lesser extent they invest into
other financial assets such as shares (5%). The valuation of investments in
pension funds in the long term is rather low and did not exceed the infla-
tion rate in many years in a row (2007,2008,2009). In 2010 the valuation if
corrected for inflation was 0.3-0.5%. This low valuation is also due to the
fact that pension funds are obliged to have non-negative annual nominal val-
uation. This condition is about to be cancelled according to the proposed
pension system reform.
5See National Strategy Report on Adequate and Sustainable Pensions (for 1999-2005),
in year 2009 it was 2.3%.
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2.3 Motivation for the Reform
In the previous text we have described the current old-age pension system
in the Czech Republic. In this section we would like to provide the reader
with reasons why the reform of the current pension system is necessary. In
the next chapters we will afterwards discuss how feasible is this reform.
2.3.1 Demographic scenario
One of the main exogenous variables that influence every pension system is
the ratio between economically active and retired population. The retired
population is always somehow dependent on the active population regardless
of the particular pension scheme adopted (as shown in Chapter 1). Therefore
in times when the population is getting older and the dependency ratio6 is
growing we have to adapt the pension system. In the 21st century almost
every developed country is facing this problem and the Czech Republic is not
an exception:
6Dependency ratio is in the of case pension systems a ratio of retired people and
economically active people. Generally the dependency ratio is a ratio of not economically
active (i.e. dependent) and economically active population (i.e. independent, productive).
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Table 2.1: Old age dependency ratio in developed countries (65+ in % 20-64)
Country Year 2000 Year 2050 Country Year 2000 Year 2050
Australia 21% 48% Korea 11% 68%
Austria 25% 55% Luxembourg 23% 40%
Belgium 28% 50% Mexico 9% 35%
Canada 20% 45% Netherlands 22% 39%
Czech Republic 22% 60% New Zealand 20% 50%
Denmark 24% 39% Norway 26% 45%
Germany 26% 54% Poland 20% 56%
Finland 25% 52% Portugal 27% 63%
France 28% 58% Slovakia 19% 57%
Greece 27% 64% Spain 27% 73%
Hungary 24% 50% Sweden 30% 43%
Ireland 19% 50% Turkey 10% 31%
Iceland 20% 40% Switzerland 25% 43%
Italy 29% 71% UK 27% 47%
Japan 28% 72% USA 21% 39%
Source: OECD.
As we see from the table, the dependency ratio is going to grow signifi-
cantly over the following years in all listed countries. The average dependency
ratio in OECD countries in this time period will more than double-up (from
22% to 47%). If we concentrate on the Czech Republic, using 2009 Czech
Statistical Office forecast and its middle scenario up to the year 2065,7 we get
the following results: While the number of population stays approximately
the same - 10.4 million in 2009 and 10.7 million in 2065 (this slight popula-
tion growth will be due to the imigration), the age structure of the society
will change a lot as shown in the following figure:
7This forecast works with three scenarios: low, middle and high. In the low scenario
one expects very low level of fertility and low level of migration, in high scenario it is vice
versa. In this thesis we present only the middle scenario.
21
Figure 2.3: Distribution of age groups in years 2010-2065 in the Czech Re-
public
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Source: CZSO.
This change of the age structure of the population does not affect only the
amount of pensioners whom a pension has to be paid (the number of people
in the oldest age group (65+) grows from 1.6 million in 2010 to 3.4 million
in 2065)8, but it also affects the amount of the contributors (the number of
people in productive age will sink from 7.4 million in 2010 to 5.8 million in
2065).
2.3.2 Financial Sustainability of the Current Public
System
The pension system reform is proposed mainly due to the fact that the cur-
rent public PAYG scheme is not financially sustainable in the long run and
therefore cannot secure future decent living conditions for the contemporary
young generation. In this subsection we would like to present the financial
balance of the public pension system and also its future projections.
Between the years 1993 and 1996 the pension system had surpluses. This
has changed in 1997 and till 2004 the system was in deficit. Main reasons for
this change is lowering the contribution rate from 27.2% to 26%. Also the
8This expenditure growth could hardly be outweigh only by raising the retirement age.
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system of public pension indexation was amended stating that the annual
pension indexation should equal at least the inflation and one-third of the
increase of the real wage which has lead to higher system expenditures. In
2004 the contribution rate was raised to 28% which lead to financial con-
solidation of the system and we have seen surpluses for many consecutive
years.
There were other important changes that were introduced in 2004 and
have helped with financing the pension system. One of them was the re-
striction of the possibility of early retirement - even though one received
lower pension if retiring earlier, this possibility was very popular and widely
used mainly because of a very high unemployment rate among older people
(according to Bezdeˇk (2005) in 2003 45% of all new pensioners have retired
earlier). The other change that was introduced was raising the minimal pen-
sion system contribution base9 for self-employed which has also led to higher
system contributions. This contribution base is in case of self-employed still
much lower than in case of employees (in 2004 the base for self-employed was
only 30.8% of the base for employees). This affects the pension system a lot
because of the increasing amount of self-employed in the system.
In the last years, contributions into the pension system were not sufficient
mainly due to higher unemployment. The adverse demographic problem also
influences the pension system balance, but in the short term issues like higher
unemployment or changes in the contribution rate are much more relevant.
The financial balance of the pension system in the last years is presented in
the following chart:
9The contribution base is a part of earnings of the self-employed that serves as a basis
for the calculation of pension system contribution.
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Figure 2.4: Financial Balance of the Public Pension System
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l l
l l
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
−2.0
−1.5
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Year
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f r
ea
l G
DP
l Balance (% of GDP)
Source: CSSZ, Mu¨ller (2000), Bezdeˇk (2005), own computations.
Because of the upcoming pension system reform in the Czech Repub-
lic there has been several studies predicting the future financial balance of
the pension system. All these studies predicted big deficits of the pension
system account mainly because of the ageing of the population. In 2004 a
committee of experts was set up in order to assess the pension system reform
proposals of the main political parties in the Czech Republic (those which
were represented at that time in Chamber of Deputies) and also the so called
basic scenario which has shown prospects of the pension system without any
reform.10
The committee predicted11 a long term annual deficit of the pension sys-
tem of about 5% of the GDP. This would mean an overall deficit of 110% of
GDP in 2065 and 260% in 2100. The replacement ratio would decrease from
42% in 2005 to 38% in 2100. These predictions did not assume that the pen-
sion system is totally rigid and the annual pension indexation and changes
in the pension calculation (mainly changes of the pension system contribu-
tion base) were taken into account. The committee also assumed that the
government bond interest rate stays the same over the examined time period
- if we allow for higher interest rate over the time, which is reasonable, the
deficit of the pension system would be significantly higher.
10At this point we are going to present only the results of the basic scenario, because
the parties’ proposals were not taken into account after 2004.
11See the Final Report (2005) of the committee. Source: Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs of the Czech Republic.
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These results were confirmed later in 201012 when discussing the pension
system reform once more after taking no significant action after presenting
the findings of the first committee in 2005. The main message of the new
committee is the same as the one back in 2005 - the current public pension
system is not financially sustainable in the long term. This second committee
predicted annual system deficit of about 4% of the GDP after 2050 and overall
debt of 100% of the GDP in 2065. The slight change in predictions is on one
hand due to parametric reforms which has been put through and updated
demographic scenario (both improving prospects of the current system) and
as well as due to the financial crisis (leading to change of prospects of the
system in the short term, but not influencing it significantly in the long term).
Also other authors came to the same result that the public pension system
is financially unsustainable in the long term. Marek (2007) for example
estimates that in 2050 the annual system deficit is going to be almost 9%
of the GDP and the overall debt 155% of the GDP. He tries to estimate the
financial balance for longer time period and according to his study in 2150
the annual deficit is going to be almost 16% of the GDP and the overall
deficit 2,526% of the GDP.
2.4 Main Reasons for the Reform
In previous sections we have shown that the current pension system in the
Czech Republic is not financially sustainable in the long run if we take de-
mographic and macroeconomic trends into account. This is one of the main
reasons why the reform is necessary. This financial balance problem leads
not only to the impossibility of guaranteeing sufficient pensions for future
old generations, but it is also intergenerationally very unjust as long as the
current expenditures of the system have to be paid by future generations.
Another important goal of the pension system reform is the diversification
of pension funding. According to the Final Report - PES (2010) in the
year 2008 the pension from the public pension system formed 94% of the
income of Czech pensioners. This is a very risky situation, because almost
all pensioners depend on one pillar. In the first chapter we have discussed
various risks to different pension schemes and in this current situation in
case of lowering public pensions for example due to lack of funds, pensioners
would find themselves in a very critical situations without having almost any
possibility to find a compensatory source of income.
12See the Final Report - PES (2010). Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of
the Czech Republic.
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Another topic to discuss when discussing the reform is also the problem
of the intragenerational redistribution. The Czech public pension system
was very egalitarian, for example in 1998 approximately 50% of all pensions
were in ±10% interval from the average pension (Bezdeˇk 2000b). That has
led to a Ruling of the Constitutional Court in April 2010 stating that the
pensions ought to be more earnings-related, which has forced the government
to change the way how to compute the pension in order to agree with the
Ruling (the so called Small Pension Reform).
The problem of intragenerational redistribution and egalitarian public
PAYG schemes is well known and many authors pointed this out (see for ex-
ample Cubeddu 1998). On the other hand some authors argue that there ex-
ists a positive correlation between one’s lifelong earnings and one’s longevity
and therefore there exists no intragenerational redistribution (see for example
Mitchell and Zeldes 1996).
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Chapter 3
Pension System Reform and
Pareto Efficiency
In this chapter we would like to start discussing the pension system reform.
Firstly, we introduce theoretical concepts of this transition and afterwards we
discuss some practical problems. We start with Pareto efficiency discussion
in this chapter and then in the next chapter we present the political economy
debate.
In Chapter 1 we presented the Aaron’s condition stating when the FF scheme
is more efficient than the PAYG scheme - if r > n + w, i.e. when the real
interest rate exceeds the sum of the population growth rate and the real wage
growth rate.1 Even though if this condition is satisfied, it does not directly
imply that the transition from a PAYG to FF scheme is efficient. The reason
for this is the existence of transition costs which are not inconsiderable.
In this section we discuss the possibility of Pareto improving transition
from the PAYG to the FF scheme. With a Pareto improving transition we
mean a transition where no generation (present or future) is worse off and at
least one generation is better off.
We start in this chapter with an article from Breyer (1989) in whose
model the Pareto improving transition from PAYG scheme to FF scheme
is not possible. Afterwards we present Homburg’s model (Homburg 1990)
where he shows that if certain conditions are met the transition could be
Pareto improving. In conclusion we compare these two approaches.
1However as it was already mentioned in Chapter 1 r = n+w should hold in the long
run according to the macroeconomic theory.
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3.1 PAYG Scheme as an Efficient Scheme
In his seminal paper Friedrich Breyer (1989) asks the question whether it is
possible after the pension scheme has been changed to compensate the first
generation of pensioners for their loss without making any future generation
worse off than under the PAYG scheme. He presents two models: an open
economy, and an closed economy model. He shows that in both cases the
transition from a PAYG to a FF scheme is not Pareto improving. We are
going to present only the first model, but at the end of this section we also
mention results of the second model (for the closed economy).
In the open economy model (as well as later in the close economy model)
an OLG model with 2 generations is applied. We use the same notation as
in the Chapter 1. We assume that the population growth rate is exogenous
and constant. We further assume that only one good exists and every worker
is endowed with an income of one unit of this good. Capital markets are
perfect in this model and the interest rate is constant and exogenous. Re-
garding the notation we have to distinguish now between the contribution
into the PAYG scheme (bPAY Gt ) and the contribution into the FF scheme
(bFFt ). Furthermore we have to distinguish between pensions paid from the
PAYG scheme (P PAY Gt ) and pensions paid from the FF scheme (P
FF
t ) which
are defined as follows:2
P PAY Gt+1 = (1 + n)b
PAY G
t+1 ,
P FFt+1 = (1 + r)b
FF
t .
We define discounted lifetime consumption (which is the same as discounted
lifetime income) for an agent in period t as
Vt = 1− bPAY Gt +
(1 + n)bPAY Gt+1 + ψt+1
1 + r
, (3.1)
where 1−bPAY Gt is the consumption in the period t and ψt+1 is a government
subsidy per pensioner which is paid as a compensation for the pension system
reform. We do not have to express the FF scheme payments, because they
do not change the lifetime consumption Vt. The last thing we have to define
is the government debt which exists due to these compensations:
Dt+1 = (1 + r)Dt + (1 + n)ψt+1. (3.2)
After these definitions we can compare two following situations. In the
first situation (let’s call this situation A), only the PAYG scheme with a
2Note that both expressions are the same as in the Chapter 1, but in Breyer’s model
the wage is constant, i.e. w = 0, and normalized to one, i.e. W = Wt = 1.
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constant contribution rate bPAY G exists (bPAY G = bPAY Gt , ∀t). In this plan,
which is set up in period t = 1, there are no government subsidies, i.e. ψt =
0,∀t. Agents of generation t = 0 have the following lifetime consumption
(note that they did not pay any contributions into the pension system, but
they receive pensions from it, because they are pensioners in period t = 1):
V A0 = 1 +
1 + n
1 + r
· bPAY G,
and agents of other generations (t ≥ 1) have following lifetime consumption:
V At≥1 = 1− bPAY G +
1 + n
1 + r
· bPAY G = 1 +
(
1 + n
1 + r
− 1
)
· bPAY G.
In the second situation (let’s call this situationB) we introduce a FF scheme
and compensate the first generation (generation 0) for not having a PAYG scheme
using a government subsidy ψ1. Let’s assume that the population growth rate
is smaller than the interest rate (g < r). Because of this compensation the
following holds:
V B0 = 1 +
ψ1
1 + r
= 1 +
1 + n
1 + r
· bPAY G = V A0 (3.3)
⇒ ψ1 = (1 + n) · bPAY G.
Paying this subsidy causes a government debt which has to be paid by
future generations. Because of the condition g < r future generations can
afford paying off this debt while getting the same pension as in plan A. The
crucial question is, whether the debt can be paid off in a finite time horizon.
This would make those future generations, who do not have to pay off this
debt better off, while making no generation worse off, because all generations
get at least the same pension as they would get in plan A.
The lifetime consumption for future generations is
V Bt≥1 = 1 +
ψt+1
1 + r
= 1 +
(
1 + n
1 + r
− 1
)
· bPAY G = V At≥1.
⇒ ψt+1 = (n− r) · bPAY G,∀t ≥ 1.
Now we examine if the government debt DB under the pension plan B can
be paid off. In the period t the debt is equal to
DBt = (1 + r)
t−1 ·N0 · bPAY G ·
[
1 + n+ (n− r) ·
t−1∑
τ=1
(
1 + n
1 + r
)τ]
,
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where the first part of the term is equal to the original debt in the period t = 1
and the second part of the term is equal to the sum of all compensations to
the following generations. The N0 stays for the size of the original population.
After several steps (see Appendix A.1) we get that the per capita govern-
ment debt remains constant over the time:
DBt
Nt
=
DBt
N0 · (1 + n)t = b
PAY G. (3.4)
This means that the government debt is never paid off, i.e. no future gener-
ation can be made better off under the plan B compared to plan A without
making any generation worse off. Therefore this transition from the PAYG
to FF scheme is not Pareto better even though we have assumed that the
rate of return of the FF scheme is higher than the rate of return of the
PAYG scheme.
In the closed economy model, which is also an OLG model with two
generations, the worker’s income and the interest rate are both endogenous.
Furthermore, in this model, after the transition from PAYG to FF scheme
is pursued, it is not possible to compensate the first retired population for
its lost without making any future generation worse off compared to their
possible gains from the original PAYG scheme. Even though if we assume
that the FF scheme is more effective - Breyer shows that the FF scheme leads
to higher per capita production in every period - the transition is not Pareto
improving.
3.1.1 Open versus Closed Economy Models
When modelling the pension system reform the question of whether an open
or closed economy model is more appropriate arises. We are aware of the
fact that a transition to a FF scheme (or to a mixed scheme) influences the
domestic interest rate to some extent. This effect is of course much stronger
in case of big economies such as Germany than in case of smaller ones such
as the Czech Republic.
In this thesis, nevertheless, we use mainly open economy models. As
Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2005) have shown in their paper the
closed economy models are doing much worse in modelling the pension sys-
tem reform compared to the open economy models due to neglecting effects
of international capital mobility. “To the extent that capital is internation-
ally mobile, population aging will induce capital flows between countries, and
these capital flows will modify the effects of population aging and pension
reform in each country vis-a`-vis a world of closed economies.” We think that
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especially within the EU the international mobility of capital is rather high
and therefore it is more appropriate to use open economy models.
3.2 Possibility of Pareto Improvement
The article of Friedrich Breyer caused a wide discussion and one of the replies
was the article of Stefan Homburg. Homburg argues that Breyer’s conclusion
about Pareto efficiency is due to the setting of his model and that it does
not correspond to reality. The main flaw of Breyer’s model is the modelling
of pension system contributions as lump-sum taxes. Therefore Homburg’s
model takes contributions as flat-rate taxes on labour income and pensions
themselves as lump-sum payments. This setting corresponds much better to
reality. Recall the fact that in the Czech pension system there is one pension
system contribution rate, which is basically a labour income tax. On the
other hand, pensions can be viewed as lump-sum transfers regardless of the
Ruling of the Constitutional Court in 2010 and the Small Pension Reform,
because strong intragenerational redistribution prevails.
Homburg (1990) presents also an OLG model with two generations. As
well as Breyer, he considers small open economy, i.e. wages3 wt and rate of
interest r are exogenous. The interest rate and the size of the population
are assumed to be constant. The member of each generation solves following
maximization problem while he is young:
max
c1t ,c
2
t+1,lt
U
(
c1t , c
2
t+1, 1− lt
)
, (3.5)
with following constraints
c1t + st = wt · lt · (1− bPAY G),
c2t+1 = (1 + r) · st + P PAY Gt+1 ,
where c1t (c
2
t+1) stays for the consumption of generation t in its first (second)
period, st stays for savings and lt denotes one’s labour supply, i.e. (1 − lt)
denotes one’s leisure. The sum of one’s labour supply and leisure is normal-
ized to one. The utility function U(·) is assumed to be strictly monotonically
increasing, strictly quasi-concave and has second derivatives. Goods are as-
sumed to be normal.
In the first step, Homburg shows that the PAYG scheme is not Pareto
efficient, i.e. it is possible to make one generation better off without making
any worse off using, as he calls it, capital reserve system cum government
3From now on we use wt for wages and not for wage growth rate.
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debt (CRCD). This system is an optimal solution to following optimization
problem:
max
b,Pt+1,Dt
Vt (b, Pt+1) , (3.6)
with the following constraints
b · wt · lt = bPAY G · wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt −Dt,
Pt+1 = P
PAY G
t+1 − (1 + r) ·Dt,
Pt+1 ≥ 0.
Note that we have to distinguish between wages and labour supplies in both
cases (i.e. between the case with the original PAYG scheme and the case
when CRCD is put into practice), because these are determined by the ex-
isting pension scheme. The first condition secures that in the period t the
retired generation gets its pension payment P PAY Gt = b
PAY G
t ·wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt
which is paid either by taxing the current working population or by a gov-
ernment debt. The second constraint secures, that the debt Dt is repaid by
the generation t. And this constraint, together with the last one secures that
the government debt ((1 + r) ·Dt) is never bigger than the implicit debt of
the PAYG scheme (P PAY Gt+1 ).
If we combine the first and the second constraint we get the following
condition:
Pt+1 − (1 + r) · b · wt · lt = P PAY Gt+1 − (1 + r) · bPAY G · wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt . (3.7)
This condition secures that the government policy (government chooses b, Pt+1, Dt)
does not change one’s lifetime income. The following holds
P PAY Gt+1 > (1 + r) · bPAY G · wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt ,
when the growth rate is bigger than the interest rate, i.e.
wPAYGt+1 ·lPAYGt+1
wPAYGt ·lPAYGt
>
(1 + r). Homburg calls this generation a winner. If the opposite holds, he
calls the generation a loser. Proving the following propositions (see Appendix
A.2 for proofs):
1. Given the generation t is a winner, the optimal government policy is to
set b∗ = 0.
2. Given the generation t is a loser, the optimal government policy is to
set P ∗t+1 = 0.
3. Given the generation t is neither a winner nor a loser, the optimal
government policy is to set b∗ = 0 ∧ P ∗t+1 = 0.
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4. The PAYG scheme, i.e. bPAY G > 0 ∧ P PAY Gt+1 > 0, is never optimal.
we conclude that the PAYG scheme is not an efficient pension system in
this model. This result is due to the existence of distorting income tax in the
PAYG scheme. By creating a government debt and cancelling the income
tax as well as the lump-sum pension, agents are better off due to cancelling
the excess burden which was caused by the labour-leisure choice distortion.
We ask the reader to note, and it will be emphasized later, that this
conclusion does not mean at all that we should abolish the PAYG scheme
as whole and replace it by the FF scheme. In this model we did not include
possible risks of both schemes which were mentioned in Chapter 1. Moreover,
when we discuss pension systems also other than economic arguments should
be taken into account - for example some redistribution towards people with
low income, which could be seen as socially just even if it is not efficient from
the economic point of view.
We have shown that the PAYG scheme is not optimal. The last step
is to show that even if the PAYG scheme already exists, it is efficient to
convert the pension system to FF scheme. As well as Breyer also Homburg
assumes4 that the interest rate exceeds the growth rate and therefore every
generation is a loser except from the first one. He shows that the government
debt used to compensate the first generations will be paid off in finite time
and all generations afterwards will be gaining from this transition while past
generations are not affected.
We introduce bt for contribution rates used in the transformation period
5
and we show that bt is bigger than b
∗
t (the contribution rates of the CRCD),
but smaller than bPAY G. It can be shown (for the proof see Appendix A.3)
that the following holds:
Given that the interest rate exceeds the growth rate and some PAYG scheme
already exists there are sequences (bt), (Pt) = (P
PAY G
1 , 0, 0, ...) and (εt) ≥ ε >
0 such that
bt · wt · lt = bPAY G · wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt −
P PAY Gt+1
1 + r
+ εt · wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt , (3.8)
Vt(bt, 0) = Vt(b
PAY G, P PAY Gt+1 ),∀t ≤ T. (3.9)
In addition such T exists and it holds that Dt = 0,∀t ≥ 0.
In such a setting generations alive till the debt is paid off are not affected,
while generations alive after the debt is paid off are gaining. The reform can
4This assumption cannot hold in the long term.
5With a transformation period we mean the period which starts with the pension system
reform and ends with paying off the government debt Dt.
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be also set in such a way that all generations are gaining, i.e. setting the
contribution rate between bt and b
∗
t .
3.3 Conclusions from the Debate
We have presented two views on the Pareto efficiency of the pension system
reform. Together with other authors (see e.g. Hirte (2003) or Bo¨rsch-Supan
(1998)) we conclude that the pension system reform can be Pareto improving
if efficiency gains are included. Feldstein (1996) computed the dead-weight
loss induced by a PAYG scheme in the USA and got the result of annual loss
of 1% of the GDP which could be according to Sunde´n (2002) even higher in
case of European countries due to higher contribution rates. If there are no
efficiency gains on the other hand, the higher return of the FF scheme is just
used to pay off the government debt used to compensate the first generations
and no generation gains anything without any other generation loosing.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this debate on Pareto improving
pension system reform has not one commonly accepted conclusion. According
to Bo¨rsch-Supan (1998), in the US literature the above mentioned opinion
about Pareto efficiency caused by efficiency gains is prevailing. Feldstein and
Samwick (1997), even though they propose such a transition to FF scheme, in
which the first generations are net losers, also present a possibility of Pareto
improving reform. But they do not recommend it, because their original
proposal leads to higher net welfare gain compared to the Pareto efficient
reform.
This is of course also a relevant approach to the reform (maximizing the
overall profit instead of everybody’s individual gain), but if we do not set the
reform in such a way that even the present generation who is a net loser does
not think that the reform is correct (or just), the reform could be blocked in
the political process.
This is due to the fact that the current generation (those who possibly
do not sympathize with this reform, because they often loose) is involved in
the political decision making process in contrast to those net winners of the
reform who are not born yet. Galasso and Profeta (2002) actually comment
the political economy models of US social security system reform as follows:
“Although there may be gains from moving to a funded, or mixed system, no
social security reform would obtain the required majority, due to transition
costs that would have to be imposed on the current (voting) generations.”
On the other hand, many authors do not think that the pension system
reform can be Pareto improving. Fenge (1995) shows that a PAYG scheme
with intragenerational fairness (contributions are proportional to wages while
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pensions are lump-sum payments) is Pareto efficient. In such setting a Pareto
improving transition to FF scheme is possible only if (i) the difference in
income within one generation is small or/and (ii) the distorting effect of
pension system contribution is strong.
Brunner (1996) presents a slightly different model. In his setting there
are two representative agents of each generation who differ according to their
abilities and therefore according to their income levels. He argues that try-
ing to reduce the dead-weight loss caused by the PAYG scheme leads to
intragenerational redistribution and therefore cannot be Pareto efficient.
As Bo¨rsch-Supan (1998) sums up: “It is only possible to resolve this
discussion between the advocates of the transformation prevailing among the
US authors and those who are indecisive using empirical results.”6
3.4 Recommendations
According to the results presented in this chapter, we recommend the pen-
sion system transition from the PAYG scheme to a mixed scheme. The
PAYG scheme such as it is now is not sustainable in the long run. More-
over the Czech Republic has one of the highest contribution rates in Europe
which leads to high inefficiencies and a transition to the FF scheme would be
welfare improving. In addition, a partial switch to a founded scheme would
presumably lead to higher savings and investments which would help the
overall economic situation in the long run.
Nevertheless we do not think that a pure FF scheme is desirable. One of
the main goals of the reform should be also a diversification of possible risks
(which has been discussed in Chapter 1), which could not be accomplished
by switching to FF scheme only, and replacing the PAYG scheme risks by the
FF scheme risks. Moreover the PAYG scheme is a vital tool of government’s
social policy, especially for fighting poverty among older people.
This proposal of switching to a mixed pension system would of course
mean that pensions of the current old generation have to be secured. In
the past years there were suggestions to use the then gains of privatisation
to cover the costs of the anticipated pension reform. Unfortunately, these
resources were consumed and therefore an increase of the value added tax is
being proposed recently. It could be also possible to fund the reform using a
government debt, but the current government refused this possibility.
One could argue therefore (which is a common argument against the pen-
sion system reform), that the current generation would have a double burden
6Author’s translation.
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- financing pensions of the current pensioners (via pension system contribu-
tions and via higher value added tax) and at the same time saving for their
own pensions. But it has to be said that this double burden was a common
thingall over the history and therefore it is not an argument against the re-
form. As Sinn (1999) points out the past generations had to bear a double
burden as well - financing pensions of the then retired generation and simul-
taneously raising up their children (and thereby securing their own future
pensions). So nowadays, where there are many families without children,
people have to invest in real capital instead of to the human capital (rais-
ing children) and therefore they carry the same double burden as previous
generations did.
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Chapter 4
Political Economy of the
Pension Reform
Before we assess the proposed pension system reform in the Czech Republic
and compare it to pension system reforms in other countries, we will discuss
this topic from yet another point of view. In this chapter we present the
findings of political economy.
In Chapter 2 we have shown why the current pension system in unsustain-
able if no reforms are taken. In Chapter 3 we have discussed the possibility
of a reform which is Pareto efficient. It turned out that, according to many
authors, this possibility exists if certain assumptions are fulfilled. Neverthe-
less, such a big reform as the pension system reform cannot be enforced by
some social planner. It has to go through democratic procedures and there-
fore there is a possibility that even the best reform1 could be rejected. This
is due to the fact that each system has its beneficiaries and if they are pow-
erful enough they can block the reform in order to maintain their benefits.
Katharina Mu¨ller (2000) writes: “Pension systems have long been considered
particularly difficult to reform, as they tend to create powerful clientele.”
As an example let us consider the following case.2 Assume that the age of
the median voter is sufficiently high, i.e. in extreme case he is already retired
or near to the retirement age. Than he would presumably vote for every
proposal which increases his pension even though it would mean increasing
the contribution rate - if he is already retired, he does not mind about the
increased contribution rate and if he is sufficiently near the retirement age,
the gains from higher pension in the near future would outweigh the current
higher contribution rate.
1With a best reform we mean a reform which maximizes the welfare of the whole society.
2Even though this example is not very realistic it helps us to illustrate the possible
political interest of the older generation.
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Ribhegge (1999) presents a slightly different example when he shows that
even when the rate of return of the PAYG scheme is always lower than
the interest rate, i.e. every generation is a loser, it is possible that each
generation would be in favour of continuous increasing of the contribution
rate. As he puts it: “[...] the more unstable the PAYG system becomes, the
larger becomes the pressure to increase pension payments.”
In his example pensions are increased in the first period by 4X which
leads to higher contribution rate for the current working population, which
opposes this proposal. But if the government promises this generation that
its future pension would be increased by 2 ·4X they would probably vote for
this proposal. This would also lead to increasing the contribution rate once
more in the future, but in order to gain the approval of the third generation
the government promises that its pension would be increased by 3 · 4X and
therefore they would not oppose this proposal. At the end, this PAYG scheme
can be set in such a way that its rate of return is bigger than the interest
rate and therefore every generation is a winner. This system can work as
long as voters think that their future pensions are not at risk. When they
stop believing that, the whole system breaks down - this is be basically the
well-known Ponzi-scheme.
Using these two examples, we have shown that because of the political
system and because of the power of particular interest groups it is possible
that even a bad reform proposal3 could be put into force. Therefore, in this
chapter we would like to present what are the most important variables which
influence the type of an enforceable pension system reform.
4.1 Favourable Conditions for Reforms
In modern societies it is not sufficient only to present a good reform proposal
which is authorized by a group of experts. In order to be able to implement
it one has to be able to persuade the majority of voters of the proposal’s
advantages. According to James and Brooks (2001) we present in this section
which conditions are likely to make the implementation of the pension system
reforms easier. In their paper they are addressing three main questions:
• The connection between political and economical forces and the prob-
ability of a reform.
• The connection between these forces and the nature of the reform (for
example the public-private mix).
3With a bad reform proposal we mean a proposal which leads for example to a system
which is not sustainable in the long-term like the one presented in Ribhegge (1999).
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• How to overcome resistance of interest groups.
We present these results and we assess afterwards the current situation in
the Czech Republic.
4.1.1 Pre-existing Conditions and Probability of the
Reform
James and Brooks, in order to asses the probability of the pension system
reform, have used the following analysis. The dependent variables were prob-
ability of structural reform and private sector share. With the first variable
they mean a probability of a reform of a PAYG scheme, leading to estab-
lishing either a private funded pillar or changing the PAYG scheme from DB
to NDC scheme. The second variable describes how big is the part of one’s
benefits coming from the privately managed pillar.
The independent variables of the analysis are implicit pension debt, gov-
ernment spending, explicit debt, level of domestic savings, pre-existing funded
plans and effective number of political parties.
The implicit pension debt variable is the most important one. The authors
hypothesis is that large implicit pension debt leads to higher probability of
the reform but lower private sector share. This is because high implicit debt
forces politicians to reform the system. On the other hand, conducting a
large-scale reform is rather discouraging, because it has large transition costs
which would even more burden the public expenditures.
The government spending variable is here to correct for possible bias
caused by the first variable. If high implicit debt is correlated with low
private sector share this could be either because of the fact that this causality
between these two variables exists or because there is a preference for large
public sector in the given country.
As well as the implicit pension debt variable, also explicit debt variable
has an ambiguous influence on pension reform. On one hand, higher explicit
debt motivate politicians to conduct the reform and to lower future fiscal
obligations. But on the other hand, high government debt discourage them
to pursue a large-scale reform, because they cannot finance the transition
costs.
Higher debt together with low level of domestic savings could also moti-
vate them, as it did according to James and Brooks in Mexico, to increase
the private sector share, i.e. increasing the domestic savings, and therefore
making the government debt available to hold in the long term without high
dependence on foreign creditors.
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The pre-existence of funded plans is presumably making the pension sys-
tem reform much more probable, because the transition costs are lower and
people are used to save in this pillar.
The last variable, the effective number of political parties, is a variable
derived from political science. It is straightforward that the more political
parties can decide upon the pension system reform the less probable it is
that the reform will be implement. And if the reform is implemented one
can expect the reform being less radical, i.e. with lower private sector share.
In the original article there is also a variable Spanish which was a dummy
variable for Spanish being a dominant language in the given country. The
idea behind this is that cultural, linguistic and also geographic proximity can
help to transmit the reform ideas. They use this variable due to the fact that
the first pension system reforms were conducted in Latin America (first in
Chile in 1981). But because of expansion of the discussions about pension
system reforms and their realisations in many different countries all around
the world we do not think that this variable is still important nowadays.
James and Brooks used data from 105 countries and confirmed that the
implicit debt was much higher among those countries which have reformed
the system. On the other hand, these countries have much lower explicit debt
which confirms their hypothesis. It was also true that there is a correlation
between previous existence of voluntary funded pillar and the pension system
reform. In their data there was not a big difference in other variables among
countries with and without reforms.
Their analysis led to following results: the implicit debt strongly influ-
ences the private sector share and if the implicit debt variable is the only
independent variable in the model an increase in the debt from 50 to 100% of
GDP causes a decrease of private sector share by 20%. Existence of this rela-
tionship was also confirmed by other authors, see for example Mu¨ller (2003).
James and Brooks have also come to conclusion in their analysis that
previous existence of pension funds increase the private sector share once the
reform in implemented and on the other hand this share is lower in countries
with more political parties having the right to decide upon the reform. In the
second analysis, where they assessed the probability of the structural reform
they stated that an increase of the implicit debt from 50 to 100% of GDP
doubles the probability of the reform and the increase of the debt from 100
to 200% of GDP doubles it once more. The external debt, savings or the
amount of political parties according to James and Brooks do not influence
the probability of the reform, on the other hand, pre-existence of a funded
pillar increases the probability of the reform.
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4.1.2 Interest Groups
With the previous subsection we answered the first two questions James and
Brooks asked in their paper. Now we define the most important interest
groups and discuss how they influence the discussion about the pension sys-
tem reform.
The benefits of a reform are not immediate. The reform is implemented
to secure a decent retirement for future generations and usually there are no
big benefits for the first generation. It is also possible that the first generation
(mainly the older ones who are close to retirement age and cannot profit from
the reform) pays the cost of the reform and therefore can easily oppose it.
It is worth noting that in this case it is not important if they really pay the
reform. Their opposition to the reform can be due to the fact that they do
not trust the politicians and their promises and would rather prefer to have
secure current pension than put this at risk.
Also the politicians are in a tough position, because, on one hand, they
know that the status quo is not sustainable in the long-term, but, on the other
hand, they want to be re-elected in next elections. They have to cooperate
with many interest groups to secure the implementation of the reform which
could lead to a very different outcome than the optimal one.
The first strong interest group is pensioners and people near retirement
age. These people are usually excluded from pension system reforms and are
guaranteed to have their previous public pension. Nevertheless, they could
be one of the main interest groups opposing the reform. This is due to the
fact that they can bear in some way costs of the reform. In the case of the
Czech Republic, as it will be described more thoroughly in the last chapter,
a change in the value added tax is proposed to cover the costs of the reform.
This tax change would heavily burden older people. The interesting question
is if these people will be convinced by the government and trust them that the
financial compensation (through pension increase) they get will be enough.
Therefore, we can expect that this group would be either against a major
pension system reform or without strong preference.
The other strong interest group is the young generation. This group
should be presumably in favour of the reform, because otherwise their future
pensions are at risk. It is of course important what the actual setting of the
reform is and how credible the politicians are, but we may anticipate less
opposition from this group. Moreover, in many countries where a reform was
implemented younger generations could decide if they want to take part on
it, i.e. usually use the privately managed pillar, or if they want to use the old
system. This option has also been proposed in the Czech reform, because,
on one hand, it ensures higher contributions into the existing PAYG scheme
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and, on the other hand, reduces the possible opposition of the reform.
The other important interest groups are the institutional groups such as
labour unions or financial institutions. The unions may oppose the reform
for many reasons. One of them being according to James and Brooks their
mutual loyalty with older members or the other being frightened that because
of costs of the reform the government will cut its spendings in other area such
as education or health services. In order to overcome their opposition they
were allowed to participate on the reform in many countries. For example
in Argentina, Hungary or Poland the unions were founders of new pension
funds.
The financial institutions, on the other hand, may be in favour of the
reform, because they are going to administer the new pension funds. They
are often lobbying for the reform. But in many cases also this group can
oppose particular setting of a reform such as guaranteed rate of return of the
fund. This is for example the case of Switzerland or Uruguay.
4.2 Political Economy and Modelling the Re-
form
If we look at the arguments of the political economy from a theoretical point
of view, we will see that older people’s concerns regarding the pension reform
might be relevant. Breyer and Stolte (1999) developed a model where they
have showed that due to the pension system reform “[...] the benefit level
will be reduced, but not as much as would be required to hold the contribution
rate constant at the present level.”
Their model is a typical OLG model with two generations, similar to those
presented earlier in the thesis. Because of the low fertility level we assume
that the median voter is already retired and therefore the older generation
has voting majority in our model and it determines the size of the contribu-
tion rate. As the model is based on endogenous labour supply, the younger
generation is reacting to the chosen contribution rate by deciding on their
labour supply. This means if the contribution rate gets too high (pensioners
get too greedy), members of younger generation avoid the official domestic
labour market and therefore avoid paying the high contribution rate. This
could be accomplished in several ways: home production, more leisure, work-
ing in underground economy or working abroad. This setting implies that
the contribution rate is basically a labour income tax and that there exists
no connection between one’s contribution and one’s future pension. This ap-
proach (old-age pension as a lump-sum payment) has already been discussed
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in Chapter 3.2. Moreover, in this particular setting there is one extra rea-
soning - one’s future pension depends exclusively on the ability to tax the
younger generation which is a key feature of the model. And therefore, there
does not have to be any direct link between one’s current contribution and
one’s future pension.
The presented model has following assumptions:
• Population growth rate nt is given exogenously.
• It is a small open economy, i.e. the interest rate rt is exogenous.
• There is no technological progress and therefore the wage w grows at
rate 1 and is constant over time.
• The representative worker (member of younger generation) decides on
his labour supply lt and savings st to maximize his utility function
Ut = U
(
c1t , c
2
t+1, 1− lt
)
with following constraints:
c1t =
(
1− bPAY Gt
) · lt − st,
c2t+1 = (1 + rt) · st + P PAY Gt+1 .
All variables have been already defined in previous chapters.
• In each period t the current retired generation decides on the contribu-
tion rate bPAY Gt in order to maximize their pension P
PAY G
t :
P PAY Gt = b
PAY G
t · lt · (1 + nt).
The current worker (member of young generation) has a following Cobb-
Douglas utility function
Ut = α · ln c1t + β · ln c2t+1 + ln (1− lt).
Given the variables bPAY Gt and P
PAY G
t+1 he chooses in order to maximize U(·)
optimal savings and labour supply functions:
st = st
(
bPAY Gt , P
PAY G
t+1 , 1 + rt
)
,
lt = lt
(
bPAY Gt , P
PAY G
t+1 , 1 + rt
)
.
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Given these response functions the current pensioner maximizes his pension
P PAY Gt with respect to the contribution rate b
PAY G
t . As a result we get (for
computations see Appendix A.4):
bPAY G
∗
= 1− 1
1 +
√
(1+α+β)·(1+r)
n
, (4.1)
P PAY G
∗
=
(α + β) · (1 + r)[
1 +
√
(1+α+β)·(1+r)
n
]2 . (4.2)
From here we can see that whenever n declines then the optimal pension
P PAY G
∗
declines as well and the optimal contribution rate bPAY G
∗
rises.
This pension system reform model with endogenous labour supply is, in
contrary to standard political economy models, able to describe the current
situation pretty well. Standard political economy models with median voter
cannot explain why there is any discussion about pension system reform in
the first place. As long as the median voter is old enough he would be able to
decide upon his pension by maximizing the contribution rate and definitely
he would not think about reforming the system.
In this model, which also presupposes that the median voter is old enough
to be able to decide upon the contribution rate, he is limited in maximizing
the contribution rate by the possibility that the young generation refuse to
pay its contribution. Therefore, even under these strong assumptions the
burden is carried by both generations.
4.3 Conclusions
A reform of a pension system is a very complicated issue. This is not only
because the reform itself influences the whole economy, but also because there
are many powerful interest groups which can oppose it. They can oppose the
reform for many possible reasons, such as lowering pensions, instability of the
proposed system or just being scared because of the change of the system.
There are also motives which are not directly connected to the pension system
reform itself, such as seeking for political power.
In this chapter we have presented the key variables influencing the reform
- not only if the reform is likely to be implemented, but also what is likely to
be the private sector share. We will see in the next chapter that the analysis
of James and Brooks is very suitable for the case of the Czech Republic.
Contrary to these authors we think that the effective number of political
parties variable is a significant variable at least in the context of the Czech
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Republic. In the last years there has not been a government which was not
either a coalition government or was without voting majority in the Chamber
of Deputies. This was, according to our opinion, one of the main reasons why
the pension system reform has not been implemented yet.
In the final report of the first expert committee (2005) we could have
seen how different conceptions of the reform each political party has. Social
democrats and communists have basically proposed only to make changes
of the then pension system. The first proposed a NDC PAYG scheme, the
second wanted to do just parametric reforms and increase revenues of the
system by increasing the labour taxation. The proposal of the Christian
democrats was closest to the current reform proposal - introducing the second
optional privately managed funded pillar. Civic democrats had the most
radical reform proposal as they proposed to introduce a flat-pension in the
amount of 20% of the average income.
These proposals are very different and finding a consensus is obviously a
complicated task. Even the current government which is relatively homoge-
neous and has the biggest amount of votes in the Chamber of Deputies in
the last years has not presented the reform laws.
In the last part of the chapter we presented a pension system reform
model from Breyer and Stolte. In this model it has been shown that the
costs of the reform are shared by both currently living generations. This was
due to the fact that the working generation could change its working habits
and therefore pay lower pension system contribution rate.
As was presented in Chapter 2 the pension system reform is inevitable.
In this chapter we have seen that because of many different interest groups
the implementation could be highly problematic. This leads to a pension
reform which is probably not the best one. Therefore, if assessing the reform
we have to take into account also the implementability of the reform and not
just the optimality of the proposal.
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Chapter 5
The Central European
Experience With Pension
Reforms
In the previous chapters we have discussed general aspects of the pension sys-
tem reform. In the upcoming two chapters we would like to discuss concrete
pension reforms. We start with reforms implemented in Central Europe,
mainly in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Afterwards, in the next chapter,
we present the Czech pension system reform.
We discuss these topics in this order because we think that due to many
similarities these countries share (both economic and historical) we should
use the experience we have gained in these countries for assessing the Czech
pension reform.
5.1 Historical Overview
In Chapter 2 we have briefly discussed the history of the Czech pension sys-
tem in order to better understand current problems. We think that knowl-
edge of the history of the system is important, because then it is easier to
describe all possible trends the system faces. On the other hand, as long as
we want to assess mainly the Czech pension system reform, we are not going
to discuss whole pension systems’ histories in the CEE region.
Nevertheless, a reform, from its definition, stands always for some change
- from the old to the new. In our case the old means mainly the pension
system in the communist era. Therefore, we start in this section with a brief
overview of the pension systems in Hungary and Poland1 before the year
1Please note that Slovakia exists since 1.1.1993. Till then there was Czechoslovakia
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1989.
5.1.1 Hungary and Poland Before 1989
Due to the political situation, pension systems in the communist countries
were similar before 1989 (Mu¨ller 1999). These systems were one-pillar PAYG
systems2 with an almost universal coverage. They were financed predomi-
nantly from the employers’ contributions (but there existed employees’ con-
tributions in Poland between the years 1968 and 1972 and in Hungary since
the year 1954) and they were not separated from the state budget. Pensions
paid in these systems were almost flat (weak benefit-contribution link), but
certain occupations were privileged.
In 1980s economic conditions in the CEE region deteriorated and this
has caused problems for pension systems. High inflation in both Poland
and Hungary caused lower pensions and one-fifth of pensioners in Hungary
was due to these conditions forced to work again in order to gain sufficient
income, while in Poland 40% of workers at pension age continued to work
instead of retiring (Mu¨ller 2000). Although the pension systems began to
have severe problems in the end of the communist era, after the year 1989
problems became much bigger.
5.1.2 First Years After 1989
The year 1989 meant for the CEE region not only the end of communist
regimes, but it also brought up the awareness of many problems which were
kept hidden in the last years. The most crucial one was the bad economic
situation in this region. According to many authors (see Cerami (2006),
Mu¨ller (2000) or Rocha and Vittas (2002)) this disadvantageous economic
situation brought more problems for pension systems in these countries in
the medium time horizon than the adverse demographic problem.
The economic transformation caused3 problems such as massive unem-
ployment, high inflation, and therefore substantial rise in poverty. On one
hand, restructuring or closing down of many state-owned enterprises caused
and for the history of the Slovak pension system before 1989 please see Chapter 2 where
we discuss the history of the Czech pension system. After the year 1989 there are already
different pension systems in both federal republics. We discuss this in the subsection
devoted to Slovak pension system.
2Before the beginning of the communist era, the pension systems in the CEE region
were predominantly FF schemes. Most of the funds’ property has been destroyed during
the war and the the remaining property was devaluated after the war due to hyperinflation.
3This transformation did not of course cause these problems per se, but due to the
transformation these problems became obvious.
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higher unemployment and therefore the pension system revenues were sub-
stantially lower. On the other hand, many among these newly unemployed
persons have rather retired than tried to find a new job.
These people have used either the early retirement scheme or the disability
pension scheme (the eligibility criteria were very liberal then) - for example in
Hungary (Mu¨ller 2000) the number of early pensioners rose by 19% between
the years 1989 and 1996 and the number of disability pensioners rose by
49.5% in the same time period. This has caused a substantial rise in pension
system expenditures.
The following two graphs show the numbers of employed persons and
pensioners in Hungary and Poland during the years 1989 and 1996. Please
note that the population was quite stable in these countries over this period
- in Hungary it has decreased from 10.4 to 10.2 million and in Poland it has
increased from 38 to 38.6 million.
Figure 5.1: Number of employed and pensioners in Hungary (1989-1996)
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Source: Mu¨ller (2000).
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Figure 5.2: Number of employed and pensioners in Poland (1989-1996)
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Source: Mu¨ller (2000).
Due to this sudden change of the system dependency ratio (from 28% to
50% in Hungary and from 39% to 61% in Poland), some parametric changes
had to be made in the PAYG scheme right after the year 1989 in order to
keep those pension systems viable.
5.2 Pension Reform in Hungary
5.2.1 Early Reforms
It has been shown in the previous subsection that there was an urgent need for
a change in pension systems right after the year 1989. Yet the first significant
change has been made under the communist regime back in the year 1989
- the pension scheme (Social Insurance Fund) has been separated from the
state budget. This was a necessary condition for the pension system to
become stable. Another important change happened in 1992 when pensions
were regularly fixed to wages which has resulted in a significant pension
decrease in mid-1990s because of a 15% drop in real wages in years 1995-
1996 (Rocha and Vittas 2002). In this year (1992) the Social Insurance Fund
was also split into two parts - one for pensions and the other one for the
health care system.
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Despite of these changes and despite having one of the highest contri-
bution rates (30.5%) in the CEE region, the newly fully autonomous pen-
sion system was experiencing deficits right from its beginning (Palacios and
Rocha 1998). Due to this fact, the parameters of the benefit formula have
been changed which has led to another drop in the replacement ratio (Rocha
and Vittas 2002).
In November 1993, the existence of voluntary private pension funds has
been allowed. To motivate people to invest in these funds, a 50% tax credit
on contributions has been provided. This has been an important fact which
has simplified the establishment of the mandatory FF pillar after the pension
system reform.4 Mu¨ller (2000) stresses in her paper the degree of fragmen-
tation on the pension fund market. In the year 1997 there were 221 pension
funds in Hungary. It is worth noting that despite the financial motivation
only 15.3% (0.6 million people) of the labour force (in 1997) has invested
in pension funds which is considerably lower than the threshold of 3 million
people which was originally expected by Hungarian experts (in the year 1999
funds had approximately 1 million contributors (Rocha and Vittas 2002)).
The average per capita monthly contribution to these funds was only 5% of
the average gross wage.
In the following years (till the pension reform in 1997) there were not
any other important legal changes. In 1996 after years of discussion it has
been decided that the retirement age will be increased to 60 until 2004 and
to 62 until 2008 (for both sexes). It is also worth noting that in these years
international institutions, mainly the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank (which have both played a very important role in the Hungar-
ian pension reform), were very active and started to press an actual pension
reform. Ferge (1999) pointed out that first after the year 1992 these institu-
tions’ proposals did not copy old proposals made by Hungarian experts, but
these institutions tried to influence the discussion with their own proposals.
They have used as an inspiration examples of pension system reforms in Latin
American countries (particularly in Chile and Argentina), although they did
not explicitly mention them: “[...] it turned out that Chile was ill-suited
as an example, because Hungarians tended to associate the ’Chilean model’
with Pinochet dictatorship under which the famous pension reform had been
conducted. Moreover, in the eyes of Central Europeans, Latin America car-
ried the stigma of being a less developed region. This might have been one of
the reasons why both the Hungarian reformers and their World Bank advi-
sors sought to distance themselves from the Chilean precedent and avoid all
4The importance of pre-existence of voluntary private FF scheme for the pension system
reform has been discussed in the previous chapter.
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reference to Latin American reforms.” (Mu¨ller 2000).
The World Bank’s proposals became relevant, because it has become ob-
vious, that the reforms implemented in last years were not sufficient and more
radical reforms had to be pursued in order to safeguard future pensions. Ac-
cording to Rocha and Vittas (2002) in case no further reforms would have
been taken (apart from those described above), the Hungarian pension sys-
tem would generate deficits of 2% of GDP in 2010 and about 6.5% of GDP in
2070 (the projection period of the study was 1997-2070). These authors state
that balancing the pension system budget in 2070 would mean increasing the
already high contribution rate up to 55% or decreasing the replacement ratio
from 60% to less than 35%.
5.2.2 The New Pension System
The pension reform laws have been passed in the Parliament in the year
1997 and came into force on January 1, 1998. The new pension system was a
mixed type consisting of PAYG and FF scheme.5 This new system consisted
of 3 tiers. The first and the dominant one is the PAYG scheme. This tier
is mandatory for everybody. The second one is the FF scheme which is
partly mandatory. The third tier is fully voluntary and consists of other
savings for retirement. These are for example voluntary pension funds from
the pre-reform period (which are still operating on the market). As one can
anticipate the reform concerns the first two tiers.
After the pension system reform came into force, there was a transition
period in which Hungarians could decide if they want to participate on the
second tier. The rules were following:
• For all workers who have firstly entered the labour market after June
30, 1998 the second tier is obligatory. Their contributions are divided
as follows - 75% goes to the first and 25% to the second tier.
• Workers who have already contributed into the pension system can
decide if they want to participate in the second tier or not. In case
they do not want to, their whole contribution goes to the PAYG scheme
(first tier). They had to meet this decision till August 1999 and till
5Please note, that even though the mixed type of a pension system is relatively usual in
the pension system reform debate, in Hungary there has been originally very radical reform
proposals (radical compared to other reform proposals in the CEE region). The Hungarian
Minister of Finance Lajos Bokros, for example, was inspired by the Chilean example and
proposed in mid-1990s a full privatisation of the pension system (Mu¨ller 2000). This
proposal has been rejected and, as well as in other CEE countries, the inspiration has
been found rather in the mixed type Argentinian example.
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December 20026 they can switch back to pure PAYG scheme in case
they want to. After this date the are obliged to be part of one of the
chosen systems (pure PAYG scheme or mixed type) without any further
switch option. Nevertheless it is possible to switch the pension fund
within the second tier twice a year.
Contributions to the pension system are paid both by employees and
employers. In the new Hungarian pension system the entire employers’ con-
tributions and a smaller part of employees’ contributions (in case they are
participating in the mixed scheme) are used to finance the first (PAYG) tier.
The second tier is financed only from employees’ contributions. The con-
tribution rate (Rocha and Vittas 2002) in the new pension system is 30%,
which is either paid whole to the first tier (one does not participate on the
new system), or 24% is paid to the first and 6% to the second tier.7
In spite of the fact that neither of the schemes is new in Hungary, both
tiers differ from their predecessors in many ways. In case of the PAYG scheme
there are tighter eligibility criteria (Rocha and Vittas 2002): higher retire-
ment age (62 for both sexes, instead of 60 for men and 55 for women); longer
working history needed for early retirement without penalties and higher
penalties and rewards for early and late retirement, respectively. It has also
been decided that from the year 2001 onwards the so called Swiss formula will
be used instead of the wage indexation. This means that not only changes in
average wage will be taken into account while determining the pension, but
also changes in the consumer price index.
New pension funds which are operating within the second tier, although
having a similar legal structure as the old voluntary funds, are strictly sep-
arated from the old ones. This is because the second tier funds are under
stricter supervision. There is, for example, a minimal size of a fund, min-
imum internal reserve threshold, required risk management (rules in what
assets and when can these funds invest)8 or duty to report quarterly. These
funds also offer guarantees for their members (Mu¨ller 2000):
6According to the original reform proposal one could switch back from the mixes scheme
to the pure PAYG scheme till December 2000. After the elections in 1998 this period has
been extended till December 2002.
7There should have been a gradual transition according to the original reform proposal
- in the year 1998 the contribution composition in case one participates on the new pension
system should have been 24% + 6%, in the year 1999 23% + 7% and from the year 2000
onward 22% + 8%. But this was changed by the new government elected in 1998 and the
composition 24% + 6% was maintained.
8These rules distinguish three types of assets according to possible risk (funds cannot
invest more than 30% of their portfolio into the riskiest one. Other rules also regulate
possible investments into foreign assets.
52
• After 15 years of participation in the second tier, annuities must be
equal at least 25% of the pension paid from the first pillar.
• Minimal guaranteed rate of return on investments9 which is annually
specified by the supervising institution.
It is worth noting that according to Simonovits (2011) Hungary was most
probably the only country in which there were paid unisex inflation-proof life
annuities in the second tier.
The new pension system was constructed in such a way that it motivated
workers under the age of 30 to participate in the mixed scheme and for every-
body older than that it was favourable to stay in the pure PAYG scheme.10
This is firstly due to the fact that longer saving period in the second tier
yields to higher investment evaluation. Secondly, a new benefit formula used
in the reformed first (PAYG) tier caused lower first tier pensions for those
who decided to participate on the new system. This was also a government’s
intention - if too many people would switch to the new system, the pension
system would not be financially sustainable due to all pre-reform pension li-
abilities.11 As a result, almost 2 million people (50% workers) have switched
to the mixed scheme, 80% of these being under the age of 40.
5.2.3 The End of the New Pension System
The Hungarian pension reform was the first one in the CEE region. Al-
though it seemed promising in the beginning, at the end it was a failure -
for example Andra´s Simonovits (2011) published a paper with an expres-
sive title: The Mandatory Private Pension Pillar in Hungary: An Obituary.
Even though in the beginning Hungary was an example to follow for many
countries in the region because of the willingness to pursue a pension system
reform (compared most notably to Czech republic and Slovenia which were
according to Simonovits (2011) the few of the ex-communist countries with
no pension reform implemented), the profligacy and unwillingness to cut ex-
penditures together with the recent economic crisis caused a collapse of the
second tier. This was due to the fact that the Hungarian government has
actually nationalized pension funds and decided to use this money to balance
the government budget.
9The second tier pension funds are obliged to contribute to Guarantee Fund which
backs this minimal guaranteed rate of return.
10In case the contribution division would be 22% + 8% as originally proposed, this age
threshold would move to age 36 (Rocha and Vittas 2002).
11According to Mu¨ller (2000) the annual budget deficit caused by the pension reform
was originally estimated at 0.8-1.3% of GDP.
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The ambivalence of politicians, on one hand, passing the reformatory
laws in the Parliament, but on the other hand, populism and increasing
expenditures, could have been seen right from the beginning. As it has been
already mentioned, the first negative move of the government was freezing
the second pillar contribution rate at 6%12. As a consequence, the second tier
was dominated by the first one and the relative insignificance of the second
tier assisted the recent events (the collapse of the second tier) to happen. If
the second tier had been relatively stronger (compared to the first tier), the
government would have been forced to try to balance the government budget
in another way.
Another government’s decision that increased the pension system expen-
ditures was the gradual introduction of the 13th pension between the years
2003 and 2006. This practice have not been changed even during the recent
crisis.
Nevertheless the main cause of the end of the new Hungarian pension
system was a decision of the political representatives. Hungary was hit very
hard by the economic crises and desperately needed to balance the state
budget. At the same time the Prime Minister Orba´n came up with a personal
income tax reform - introducing a flat rate tax which would have caused, in
the short run, even higher deficit. The Hungarian political elite has decided
to solve this problem by using resources from the second tier.
In October 2010 contributions to the pension funds have been suspended
and people were enabled to abandon the mixed scheme and return to the
pure PAYG scheme (first pillar). Two weeks later the second pillar has been
virtually closed down: people were given an option - either return to the
pure PAYG scheme or stay in the mixed scheme,13 but forfeit all rights to
their contributions to the first pillar accrued after 2011. As a result, due to
this setting, staying in the mixed scheme was not an real option. According
to Simonovits (2011) at the end 97% of workers have decided to switch to
the pure PAYG scheme. This has happened without any big protests or
demonstrations, which showed the disappointment with the second pillar.
The pension fund resources have been used for budget deficit reduction and
for enabling the tax reform.
12Please not that between the years 2003 and 2006 the second pillar contribution rate
was 8%
13With the contribution rate 10% into the second pillar.
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5.3 Pension Reform in Poland
5.3.1 Early Reforms
After the year 1989 there has been 3 public pension PAYG schemes in Poland.
The main one was administered by the Social Insurance Institute and has
covered the major part of population. Alongside of this scheme there was a
special scheme for farmers and also a special scheme for policemen, soldiers
and prison guards. This public system was till the reform in 1999 the only
provider of old-age pensions. Until then there were neither mandatory nor
voluntary private funds. In the following text we will mainly discuss the
scheme covered by the Social Insurance Institute.
The pension system contribution rate was 36.7%. Nevertheless the pen-
sion system was experiencing continual budget deficits and high state subsi-
dies were needed - according to Mu¨ller (2000) annual subsidies were 1.1-4.3%
of GDP, while total pension system expenditures were 14-15% of GDP. We
cannot say that these deficits were only because of a bad pension system
setting. Kluza and Ostaszewski (2003) point out that due to a complicated
situation on the job market after the revolution, people were encouraged to
retire earlier, which had caused bigger deficits. Main changes in the system
in early 1990s were (Golinowska 2006):
• Introducing of automatic wage indexation of pensions
• Early retirement possibilities
• Special scheme for farmers
Some of these changes have been changed later again. Like in Hungary,
a mix indexation (by prices and wages) has been introduced also in Poland.
As mentioned above, the dependency ratio rose noticeably in early 1990s,
while some parts of Polish economy began to grow rapidly. Kluza and Os-
taszewski (2003) write: “[...] many workers retired early, took disability
benefits, or become unemployed, the remaining ones participated in a rapidly
recovering economy, with real wages showing significant gains.” This led to
pensions which were higher than the Polish society could afford (due to wage
indexation) and therefore the mixed indexation has been introduced.
5.3.2 The New Pension System
The new pension system has replaced the old one in 1999. Main goals of
the reform were financial stability and risk diversification (before the reform,
there was just the public pension system).
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At first (in January), the reformed first tier (PAYG scheme) came into
force, while the new second tier (FF scheme) started later, in April 1999.
Together with the second tier, which was mandatory for certain workers (see
below), a third pillar consisting for example of pension plans provided by
employers was enabled as well. As in other states in the CEE region, the
first tier is a mandatory tier for everybody. The obligation to participate on
the second tier depends on the age of the contributor:
• Contributors younger than 30 years are obliged to participate on the
mixed scheme.
• Contributors older than 30 and younger than 50 can decide whether to
join the mixed scheme or not (there was a one-year decision period).
• Contributors older than 50 years have to remain in the one-tier system.
The first tier has been reformed as follows: instead of a defined-benefit
scheme, it has been changed to a notional defined-contribution scheme.14
This fact has created certain problems, because there were kept no records
of individual contributions so far and the starting capital has to be computed
which will take up to 5 years according to Mu¨ller (2000). There is also an
increase in pension (up to 10%) for those who retire later. Contrary to other
pension reforms in the region the retirement age has remained the same: 65
for men and 60 for women.
The second tier, as well as in other states, consists of private pension
funds. These funds are under strict supervision and provide the contributor
with variable safety regulations. Apart from those ordering to have separated
fund’s assets and resources used to operate the fund, there are on one hand
investment rules (limiting derivatives and foreign exposures - funds cannot
hold more than 5% on each of them (Kluza and Ostaszewski 2003)) and
on the other hand contributors are guaranteed to have a certain minimum
return on investment - return on investment of a given fund must exceed half
of the average of the return on investments of all pension funds or cannot
be lower than 4 percentage points than this average. In case the rate does
not exceed the lower of these two thresholds the fund has to compensate its
contributors. In case of fund’s insolvency, the compensation is paid from the
Guarantee Fund or directly from the state budget (Mu¨ller 2000). There is
also a guarantee of pension indexation that covers at least inflation.
14This means that contributors are virtually investing their money and a virtual interest
rate is accrued to their deposits. See Chapter 1.
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As well as in other pension systems, contributions are paid both by em-
ployers and employees. The pre-reform contribution rate at 36.7% has re-
mained the same (in the old system, contributions were paid only by employ-
ers). The entire employers’ contributions are now paid to the first tier (19.6%
of the standardised gross wage). Roughly half of employees’ contributions
(9.8% of the standardised gross wage) are paid to the first while the second
half (7.3% of the standardised gross wage) to the second tier.
5.3.3 Conclusions
We have seen in the description above that there are many similarities be-
tween the new Polish and the new Hungarian pension system. But there are
also many differences, one of the biggest being the ratio of a pension paid
from the first and from the second tier. We have seen that a prevailing part
of a Hungarian pension is paid from the first tier. The Polish reform had
different aims. Future pensions of participants in the mixed scheme will be
paid in 37.5% from the second tier and in 62.5% from the first tier.15 In the
future the aim is to fix this ratio on 50%-50% (Mu¨ller 2000).
First problems of the new system have started right after its launching
(Kluza and Ostaszewski 2003). The setting of the pension system ordered
participants of the mixed system to pay their whole contribution to the state
Social Insurance Enterprise (ZUS) and this institution sent the respective
amount to the chosen pension fund. After the economic slowdown in 2000 the
ZUS started to have financial problems, which caused a delay in payments
to the funds. This was broadly criticized by the media and public and it
influenced the public perception of the reform.
We have said that the long-term aim is to have 1:1 ratio between the
first and the second pillar. This, apart from advantages mentioned earlier,
brings also problems such as financial sustainability in the transition period.
According to Wiktorow (2007), in 2006 transfers from the state budget to
the pension system reached almost half of the state budget deficit. Even
though coping with substantial transition cost while implementing pension
system reform is inevitable, as discussed in Chapter 3, these high transfers
could be (and were, see below) a motivation for populist politicians to stop
the ongoing reform in order to stabilize the state budget in the short term
and in this way please their voters.
15Please not that the discrepancy between the ratio in contributions to the first and to
the second pillar and respective pension paid from these pillars is caused by the fact that
part of the contribution paid to the first pillar is used for financing the work injury and
sickness provision and disability and survivors’ pensions.
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During the crises in 2009 Poland, like other countries, got into financial
problems. Because substantial part of the budget deficit consisted of the
pension system transfers it seemed that the easiest way how to fix the prob-
lem in the short run would be a change in the pension system setting. As a
result, in December 2010 the Polish government decided to lower the contri-
bution rate to the second pillar from 7.3% to 2.3% (while the overall pension
system contribution rate remained unchanged) with an aim to increase it up
to 3.5% in the year 2017. This modification led to higher contributions into
the first pillar, lowering the direct budget transfers and therefore stabilizing
the public finance.
According to many economists, this system modification is not compara-
ble with the Hungarian case. For example David Marek16 suggested that this
was just a parametric change not comparable with the Hungarian property
rights violation and it has solved urgent needs of the Polish government. As
an impact the budget deficit should be lower by 0.8% of GDP in 2011 and
by 1.7% in 2012.
5.4 Pension Reform in Slovakia
5.4.1 Early Reforms
The independent Slovak Republic was founded on January 1, 1993. Until
then, it was a part of Czechoslovakia (see Chapter 2 for pension system
description in the time period before the year 1989). Nevertheless, between
the revolution in 1989 and the year 1993 pension systems in Czechoslovakia
were separated (for further information, see below). In the period between
the years 1993 and the pension reform implementation in 2005 the evolution
of the system was very similar to other already described pension systems in
the region and we will therefore discuss it only very briefly.
The system has experienced substantial deficits due to higher unemploy-
ment and early retirements in 1990s. The main changes of the pension system
in this time period were the following (Margo´cˇ 2009):
• In 1993 social policies such as pensions or health care were newly fi-
nanced from social contribution instead of from taxes (as in years 1990-
1992).
• In 1994 the pension system budget was set aside from the state budget.
16Interview with David Marek on December 30, 2010 on radio Cˇesky´ rozhlas,
http://www.rozhlas.cz.
58
• In 1997 voluntary FF pillar has been introduced.
Contributions to this pillar can be paid either by the employer or by the
employee and state provides a contribution as well. The insured person has
a guarantee that there cannot be a negative nominal return on investment.
5.4.2 The New Pension System
The new Slovak pension system is, as it is usual in the CEE region, a mixed
type. The first pillar is a mandatory PAYG scheme, the second and the third
are FF schemes (one mandatory and one voluntary).
Part of the pension system reform was also a reform of the PAYG pil-
lar which came into force in January 2004. One of the main changes was
strengthening the link between contributions and future pensions. We have
seen this trend also in other countries and it is a natural development after
spending many decades under the communist regime. Despite the fact that
this step has a strong motivational aspect for contributors, it could be polit-
ically unwise to promote such proposal. For many interest groups (such as
trade unions) it is already almost unacceptable to introduce a funded pillar
to the pension system. Introducing a motivational aspect into the first pillar,
one of the main objectives of which is a prevention from poverty, can lead to
rejection of a otherwise tolerable reform proposal.
Other important changes in the reformed PAYG pillar were gradual in-
crease of the retirement age to 62 for both sexes, men have reached this
retirement age in 2006, women will reach it in 2015 (in the old system it was
60 for men and 53-57 for women - depending on number of raised children).
Moreover there is a financial bonus (penalty) for those who retire later (ear-
lier) - in both cases it is 0.5% of the pension for every month, for which one
retires later (earlier) (Lesay 2006). In the new system there is also regular
pension indexation instead of ad hoc indexation made by politicians in the
old system.
The second pillar, which is a mandatory17 FF scheme, started in January
2005 (one year after the first pillar was reformed), but Slovaks had one and
a half years to decide whether they want to participate (without an option
to return back to the one-pillar system). New participants on the labour
market do not have the possibility to decide, they have to participate on
the mixed scheme. On the other hand, pensioners and people with less than
10 years to retirement age have to stay in the one-pillar system. Regarding
the contributions, employers pay 14% of the gross wage (out of which 5
17Mandatory only for certain group of workers, see below.
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percentage points to the first and 9 percentage points to the second pillar)
and employees pay 4% of the gross wage to the first pillar.
Every insured person has the possibility to switch a fund once a year
without paying any fee. Moreover every pension management company is
obliged to offer several types of pension funds:18
• Growth fund - volatile, high-risk investments (up to 80% of the portfolio
might be stocks)
• Balanced fund - moderate-risk investments (at least 50% of the portfolio
must be bonds)
• Conservative fund - low-risk investments
As one is getting older there are regulations which specify in which type
of fund one can invest. Contributors who are less than 15 years before the
retirement age are not allowed to invest into the growth fund and everybody
who is 7 years and less before the retirement age must switch to the conser-
vative fund in order to preserve his or her savings. When one retires, there
are two possibilities of withdrawing pension money (Lesay 2006):
• Buying an annuity in any life insurance company using the pension
fund savings (such saving is than no longer inheritable).
• Buying an annuity as in the example above but using only part of the
saved money (there is a minimum value of such an annuity). The rest
of the savings can be gradually withdrawn from his account and this
part of his saving is part of potential inheritance.
In case a pension fund contributor dies before he retires, his pension fund
savings is inherited.
5.4.3 Evolution of the New System
In the beginning of the pension reform in Slovakia it seemed to be a big
success. According to Sˇafa´rˇ (2010) almost 70% (1.5 million) of working pop-
ulation joined the second pillar. But shortly after the reform implementation
there was a government change in Slovakia and the new left-wing prime min-
ister, opponent of the reform, used it to make certain changes. At the end of
2007 the average return on investment from pension funds was 1.5% which
was considered unsatisfactory. Therefore in the time period between January
and June 2008 people were enabled either to opt out from the second pillar
18See Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, http://www.finance.gov.sk.
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or, on the other hand, to join the mixed scheme. Moreover, a promise was
made to those opting out from the funded pillar that their first pillar pension
would be as if they did not join the second pillar at all. As a result, more
than 100 thousand people opted out, while 20 thousand people decided to
join the second pillar.
The recent financial crises caused that rate on investment decreased be-
low 0%. The government’s reaction was a repetition of the above described
scheme. Between November 2008 and June 2009 there was again the pos-
sibility to opt out (or join) the second pillar. According to government
(Sˇafa´rˇ 2010) this move was introduced in order to protect contributors’ in-
vestments. According to the right-wing opposition this has been done in
order to solve deficits in the first pillar budget (savings of those opting out
are transferred from the pension fund to the first pillar). Interestingly, on
one hand, the left-wing government itself invited people to opt out from the
second pillar.19 And, on the other hand, the Social Insurance Agency, which
is managing the first pillar, expected 150 thousand people to opt out and
sent a direct mail to 400 thousand people to persuade them to return to
the one-pillar system (at the end only 56 thousand people returned, while
32 thousand people joined the second pillar20). It is important to note that
enabling people to opt out forces pension funds to keep higher share of liquid
assets in their portfolio in order to be able to pay out people who are leaving
the second pillar. This decreases the funds’ rate of return even more (Hlava´cˇ;
Schneider 2011).
Moreover, pension management companies are newly obliged to guarantee
non-negative rate on return on a six month basis. This regulation has been
widely criticised (see for example the National Bank of Slovakia Finance
Sector Analysis, 2009) due to the length of the time period. Pension funds
ought to look for long-term investments and such regulations negatively affect
their investment strategies. Growth funds with their volatile portfolios are
affected most visibly. As a result all types of pension funds followed the
conservative investment strategy in order to prevent considerable short-term
downswings.
19See for example http://www.penize.cz/duchody/64970-penzijni-reforma-na-kolenou-
slovaci-si-na-duchod-uz-sami-nenaspori.
20Finance Sector Analysis (2009), National Bank of Slovakia, available at
http://www.nbs.sk.
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5.5 Lessons from CEE countries
We have described basic parameters of recent pension reforms in Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia. What lesson can we learn from these reforms? We have
seen that the basic setting of these reforms was very similar.
At first, there were certain changes in the first decade after the fall of
communist regimes. This usually included:
• Tightening eligibility rules in the PAYG schemes such as:
– prolonging the necessary working period
– increasing the retirement age
– strengthening the link between contributions and future pensions
• Introducing voluntary FF scheme with a state subsidy
After this pre-reform period with more or less parametric changes, there
was a period of systemic reforms. These reforms were at least in the regional
context path changing. They had usually the following common features:
• Further reforms of the PAYG scheme following the pre-reform changes
• Introducing a partially mandatory FF scheme
• Recognition of pension rights accrued before the reform
Pension reforms in the CEE region were originally very ambitious. The
new second (funded) pillar was supposed to be equal with the traditional
PAYG scheme. Such reforms, although promising substantial gains in the
long run (see for example Melichercˇ´ık; Ungvarsky´ (2004)), were very costly
in the short run. This was caused mainly due to the fact that introducing
the second pillar causes lower contributions paid to the first pillar while the
amount of pensions paid from this pillar remained unchanged in the short
run.21
Contributors to funded pillar were certainly aware of the fact that this
investment is not risk-free. Moreover investing via pension funds is a long
term investment and one can anticipate that there will be upswings as well
as downswings in the value of the investment. Unfortunately, shortly af-
ter implementing pension system reforms, the financial crises started. The
performance of the economy decreased and many people have lost their jobs.
This has of course influenced also the performance of pension funds (although
21For detailed information see Chapter 3.
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it has not influenced contemporary pensioners, because at that time, due to
the short time of existence of pension funds, there were almost no beneficia-
ries from the second pillar).
The crisis has also influenced the amount of contributions into the first
pillar (PAYG schemes were already in deficit due to the transition costs and
consequences of the recent crisis worsened their financial balance even more).
The easiest and fastest solution of this financial problem was reverting the
new pension system into the old one. Pension funds were endowed with re-
sources and many contributors were scared not to loose their investment.
Politicians have found a simple and fast populist solution and thereby post-
pone solving the pension system crises. We have seen this development in
all countries in the region, even though the extent of this solution varied in
individual countries.
What lesson can we learn from this experience? We have discussed in
previous chapters arguments for and against a pension system reform. We
have argued that a pension reform is necessary and that a mixed type of
pension reform is appropriate. We have shown that in the CEE region many
countries have implemented suitable pension system reforms. It has become
apparent very soon that the main flaw of these pension reforms were not
the reforms themselves, but politicians. These reforms were enforced usually
by one party (or a coalition of them) without a broad consensus across all
relevant political parties and all important interest groups in the society and
right after the next elections, the new winners have considerably changed the
new pension system (usually by reverting it back to the old system).
Pension system reform is a long-term project and a full switch from the
old system to the new one can last up to 30 years.22 There are usually,
before the reform starts, certain resources which are designated for covering
the transaction costs of the reform - revenues from a newly introduced special
tax or profits from privatizing state property. Unfortunately, especially in
the time of crises, these extra resources (and the resources form the newly
founded second pillar funds) are usually used to solve contemporary issues
instead of something, which can become a really big problem in a decade or
more. By effectively cancelling the pension system reform we do not solve
the problem, we only postpone it and make it potentially worse. Moreover,
when politicians will try to pursue the next pension reform (which will have
to happen, as we argued in earlier chapters) they will not have the needed
political capital they had before the first reform, which will make things only
harder.
22This figure available at http://www.profit.cz/clanek/duchodova-reforma-k-
nezaplaceni (downloaded on December 11th, 2011).
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Chapter 6
Pension Reform in the Czech
Republic
In the last chapter of this thesis we want to use the theoretical background
from the first part of this paper and the experience gained from pension
reforms in the CEE region to assess the Czech pension system reform. Reform
laws have been passed recently, in November 2011, and the new system starts
to work in 2013. Due to this fact we cannot evaluate how the system really
works in practice, but we will evaluate the structure of this reform and try
to predict how functional it is going to be.
6.1 The New Pension System
6.1.1 Political Background
After the elections in May 2010 the new right-wing government came into
power. With 118 deputies (out of 200) it was a government with the biggest
support in the history of the Czech Republic and this setting, after many
years of weak governments, was promising due to the government’s ability to
enforce reforms (pension system, tax system and health care system reforms),
which was according to proclamations the main purpose of its existence.
On the other hand, the temptation to ratify far-reaching changes as the
above mentioned reforms without thorough discussions with other parties
was high. The government was accused by opposition groups that it did not
take their reform proposals into consideration at all. Trade unions have orga-
nized many demonstration against governmental reforms and the strongest
opposition party, social democrats, have protested that the government is
not taking their opinions into account. As a result, after passing the re-
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form bills in the Chamber of Deputies, the social democrat leader Bohuslav
Sobotka announced that his party is prepared to basically cancel one of the
main motives of the pension system reform - the second pillar - after the next
elections.1
We are aware of the fact that the essential role of an opposition is to
oppose governmental proposals and we approve of this. Nevertheless, there
is a fundamental difference between a reform with a long-term impact such as
the pension system reform and a reform without many long-term implications
such as for example a new rules for the Czech Television or for other public
institutions. The attitude the opposition has to the reform is not the one
we should be looking for. We have seen that in the other countries in the
region the opposition basically cancelled the pension reform with the first
financial problems they encountered. Announcements such as the one from
Bohuslav Sobotka can not only damage the pension reform in case they
come true, but they can also strongly influence the success of the reform by
discouraging people to take part in it because of the uncertainty they will
be facing. If a new labour market entrant has to decide whether to invest in
the second pillar for many decades, he has to take into consideration what is
the probability the new system will last for such a long time period. With
the experience from the region one has and the rhetoric one hears from many
Czech politicians one could fear that this probability is not high enough.
6.1.2 The First Pillar Reforms
The new pension system in the Czech Republic is similar to those we have
discussed earlier in this thesis. The reform consists of two parts - one is
reforming the first (PAYG) pillar and the second one is introducing the second
(FF) pillar.
The reforms within the first pillar have been passed in the first half of the
year 2011 (the so called Small Pension Reform2) and should be implemented
within a year. The first change is increasing of the retirement age. In the new
pension system there is no restriction on this prolongation which is going to
be permanent. For men the retirement age will be prolonged for 2 months
every year, for women firstly for 4 months and than from the year 2018 on
for 6 months every year. The following charts show the prediction of the
retirement age and the impact of this prolongation on the average length of
retirement:
1See http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/domaci/152838-cssd-nezrusi-vsechno-treba-za-
pobyt-v-nemocnici-budeme-platit-dal.
2It has been already mentioned in the end of Chapter 2.
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Figure 6.1: Increasing of Retirement Age
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We see that, on one hand, this arrangement makes perfect sense and
fixes the length of retirement period which is necessary to balance the pen-
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sion budget. On the other hand, despite the longevity we are experiencing,
the list of possible jobs for older workers is not very wide (there will be an
exception for manual workers such as miners and they can retire earlier) -
even undemanding office positions can be due to reduced ability to concen-
trate inaccessible for people close to 70 not speaking about the necessary
re-qualification. Therefore, at the end, this arrangement could cause mas-
sive unemployment among people close to retirement age, which would be a
substantial burden for the budget either due to more unemployed or due to
more early retired. The later solution of the problem of employment of older
workers would replicate the situation of 1990s. That means the success of
this change strongly depends on the willingness of companies to hire older
workers and also on possible state employment politics.
Apart from this, other changes have been made. Due to the Ruling of
the Constitutional Court in 2010 the government was obliged to change the
pension computation method in order to make the link between contributions
and future pensions stronger. As a result, pensions of middle-income workers
(with income between CZK 12,500 and 36,000, which is between 50% and
144% of the average wage in 2011) are going to be lower by approximately
4% in order to compensate the increase of pensions of high-income workers.
Pensions of low-income workers (with income under CZK 12,500) will not
be changed. There is going to be also a lowering of the cap for pension
system contributions from six times of the average wage to four times. This
arrangement should lead to make the Czech labour market more competitive.
The pension adjustment will be the same as now - pensioners will be
compensated fully for inflation and one third of the change of average real
wage every time when the yearly sum of these two variables exceeds 2%. But
the novelty is, that the government cannot increase pensions more than that
- we have seen many increases of pensions or other social expenditures before
elections in the past which was always only a big burden for the state budget.
6.1.3 The Second Pillar Reforms
The main part of the pension system reform is, as in other countries, estab-
lishing the second pillar with the FF scheme. This part of the reform should
be implemented in 2013, but many politicians think about postponing the
start of the second pillar to 2014 (prime minister Petr Necˇas announced this
possibility on November 3, 20113). This possibility, which is caused mainly
by legal issues (not all laws tied together with the pension reform have been
3See http://zpravy.ihned.cz/politika/c1-53500890-zruseni-stravenek-a-jednotna-dph-
budou-asi-pozdeji-necas-zvazuje-odlozeni-reforem-o-rok.
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yet passed in the Parliament), is very disturbing for pension funds. Rep-
resentatives of current pension funds4 are worried that one postponing of
the reform could lead to continual postponing and at the end of the day
cancelling the reform at all.5
The Czech second pillar, contrary to pension systems in the region, is on
a voluntary basis. Originally, the government intended to make the second
pillar mandatory as in other countries, but they gave in to objections from
the opposition and trade unions.6 As a result, all workers have to decide until
they are 35 years old, whether they want to participate in the second pillar.
Workers who are older than 35 years in the time the reform is implemented
they have 6 months do decide. This decision is irreversible and one cannot
cancel the participation in the second pillar.
The contribution of participants of the second pillar is 5% of the gross
wage. 3 percentage points are opted out from the contribution to the first
pillar (i.e. one contributes 25% instead of 28%) and the remaining 2 percent-
age points have to be paid extra from the employee. This means the overall
contribution rate is 30% of the gross wage plus the voluntary savings in the
third pillar.
As in other countries, every pension management company has to offer
different types of pension funds (in the Czech Republic there are four of
them):7
• Government bonds fund - this fund can invest only in bonds issued by
the Czech Republic (or the Czech National Bank), by any member state
of OECD (or its national bank) assuming their rating is premium8 or by
international institutions such as the World Bank or the International
Monetary Fund. These funds can also invest in bank deposits, but this
investment cannot exceed 10% of the fund’s portfolio.9
• Conservative fund - apart from the possible investments described
above, this fund can also invest in all bonds and money market in-
struments with premium rating or securities issued by mutual funds
4We mean pension funds within the voluntary pillar - the future third pillar.
5See http://byznys.ihned.cz/c1-53562170-fondy-znervoznuji-uvahy-o-odkladu-penzijni-
reformy.
6See http://www.patria.cz/Zpravodajstvi/1829794/drabek-vlada-z-druheho-pilire-
neustoupi-ekonomove-se-na-nem-neshoduji.html?culture=en-US.
7See the Pension reform bill, Part 6, Catch III., available at http://www.psp.cz.
8With premium rating we mean their rating is in one of the five highest categories and
is certified by a internationally recognized rating agency.
9Please note that such a way of financing pensions (investing solely into government
bonds) is not really a FF scheme.
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with certain restrictions such as the main aim of the fund being pre-
serving the net value of the investment. The property of the fund has
to be secured against the currency risk.
• Balanced fund - apart from the possible investments described above (in
which case this fund’s investments can be within seven highest rating
categories), this fund can also invest in stocks traded on a regulated
stock market (stocks cannot exceed 40% of the value of the fund’s
portfolio). 75% of property of the fund has to be secured against the
currency risk.
• Dynamic fund - apart from the possible investments described above
(in which case this fund’s investments can be within nine highest rating
categories). This fund’s portfolio can be compounded with up to 80%
of shares. 50% of property of the fund has to be secured against the
currency risk.
Every participant of the second pillar chooses his fund type (or a mixture
of funds, but within one pension management company) and this decision
can be changed over time. Nevertheless, according to the rules of the pension
system his decision is restricted depending on the amount of years on has
before retirement as follows:10
• 10 years - one cannot invest in a dynamic fund.
• 9 (8,7,6) years - at least 20% (40%, 60%, 80%) of participant’s portfolio
has to be in a conservative fund.
• 5 (or less) years - the whole participant’s portfolio has to be in the
conservative fund.
This regulation guarantees lower volatility of the portfolio when one is
closer to the retirement age, which could be useful in case of bigger turbu-
lences on the financial markets such as in recent years.
Regarding paying out the pension, participants have more options to
choose. When one retires one can choose between the following:11
• Lifelong pension (no inheritance possibility, once the pension has started
to be paid out).
10See the Pension reform bill, Part 2, Article 11, available at http://www.psp.cz.
11See the Pension reform bill, Part 3, Catch II., Article 18, available at
http://www.psp.cz.
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• Lifelong pension with a three-year pension payment to a specified in-
heritor after participant dies.
• 20 years long pension payment (in case participant dies earlier, the
remaining pension is paid out to an inheritor).
There is no possibility of one time withdrawal. In case the participant
dies before a pension payment, his investment is a part of his inheritance.
6.2 Objections Against the New System
During the pension reform discussion and after the approval of the reform
proposal, many objections have been raised. In this part we want to discuss
only the most crucial ones. At this point we do not want to discuss those
objections concerning the importance of the reform itself. This topic has been
already discussed earlier. We would like to show that all main objections are
linked mainly to the politics of the reform and that the main problem of
the reform could be the incompetence to explain the reform, unwillingness
to successfully defend the reform, and last but not least, the mistrust people
have towards politicians (which is often justified).
The first crucial point is the financing of the reform. Unlike in Slovakia
no income from privatizing any state enterprise has been saved to finance the
reform. The Czech government declared its unwillingness to issue any debt
to finance the transition period of the reform. As a result, the government
wants to finance the reform with increasing the value added tax. Currently
there are two tax rates - the basic one (20%) and the reduced one (10%).
The reduced one is applied on food, housing or medical aid. This lowered
rate will be continuously increased to 17.5% in year 2013, while the basic
one will be lowered to the same rate. As a result there will be one value
added tax rate and the income from this change is estimated on CZK 22
billion. Nevertheless, the effective income will be much lower due to promised
compensations for low and middle income households.
Although it is obvious that any tax increase or income cut will be per-
ceived very negatively in the society, the way this government has chosen is
not the best one in our opinion. Firstly, it had to be apparent for the gov-
ernment that increasing such a socially sensitive tax (despite the promised
compensation) will be basically helping the left-wing opposition with its elec-
tion campaign. Moreover, it is very probable that in case the current oppo-
sition wins the next election, the value added tax with its two rates will be
reimplemented, which would make the new pension system harder to sur-
vive. Secondly, there is no guarantee that the money will be really used to
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finance the pension reform. We have seen many times in the past that there
has been a raise of a particular tax to finance a particular issue (for example
the so called “flood tax” introduced in 2010), but at the end it was always
impossible to control whether the money really went to solve that particular
issue. Thirdly, and this is a pure political misstep, there is the timing of the
tax rise. The tax rise is planned one year before the pension reform starts.
This fact strengthens the suspicion mentioned above, because why to raise
money for a reform, which has not started yet?
The second crucial point is the setting of the second pillar. We would like
to discuss two problems here: the second pillar being voluntary (but without
option to re-evaluate the original decision) and the problem of effectively
having two third pillars.
On one hand, making the new second pillar voluntary is a political com-
promise, because the original reform proposal contained mandatory second
pillar. On the other, hand it brings up many problems. The first problem
is planning the reform. It is unclear how many people will join this pillar,
in other words how many people will opt out from the first pillar and how
much will the transition period cost. This posts problems not only on the
government when planning the reform, but also on the pension management
companies. This uncertainty could lead to higher fees and smaller fund port-
folio for second pillar participants (pension fund representatives will take the
conservative path assuming lower participation rates).
The other problem with having the second pillar voluntary is the political
risk.12 Due to the weaker link between contributions and future pensions in
the first pillar, participating on the second pillar is much more profitable for
people with higher income. This could lead to a very unfavourable situation
where the majority of society, without having invested much in the second
pillar, would elect a politician who would be more than willing to use (i.e.
nationalize) this funds in order to balance the state budget.
The last problem we wanted to discuss is having effectively two third
pillars after the reform. From the second pillar description discussed above we
can see that the difference between the second and the third pillar is not very
big and in fact these pillars could compete for contributors. The third pillar is
subsidized from the state and one gets the maximum subsidy if contributing
CZK 2,000 a month which is approximately 11% of the average net wage.
That means for a contributor to gain the maximum, he has to contribute
CZK 2,000 a month into the third pillar and first after than contribute to
the second pillar. According to the Czech Banking Association analysis13 this
12See for example an analysis from Czech Banking Association, http://www.czech-ba.cz.
13See above.
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would most probably lead to a low participation rate in the second pillar,
because people are not willing to contribute for their pensions that much on
average.
6.3 Evaluation
A pension system reform is always a topic with a lot of controversy. It is a
change which will influence living conditions for many decades. Therefore,
on one hand, it is very problematic to reach a broad consensus on the setting
of the reform (or more precisely on the new pension system), on the other
hand, this is the reason why reaching a broad consensus is essential if we
want the reform to survive a longer time period. We think that the current
Czech reform could be a very good starting point for a debate. We do not
think it is the right reform to implement. We have many reasons for this.
The reform as a whole is heading in the right direction. It improves the
possibility of long-term financial sustainability of the system, it diversifies
risks and it forces people to act more responsibly and not rely that much on
help from the state. Moreover, we can assume that there will be an increase
in long-term savings which is positive for the economy.14
Unfortunately, a favourable setting of a reform does not guarantee its suc-
cessful implementation. We think that the most important variable, when
speaking about long-term reforms, is political support and we have shown this
in the previous chapter with the experience from the CEE region. This con-
clusion is consistent with findings of many authors, see for example Schnei-
der (2011). We are aware of the fact that the earlier a pension system reform
will be implemented the better - and we have argued why (Chapter 2). How-
ever we do not think that any reform is better than nothing. Reform without
broad political support, such as the current one, cannot succeed for the fol-
lowing two reasons:
• Firstly, it will be most probably either cancelled or completely re-
reformed after the government changes, like in other countries in the
region.
• Secondly, because people are aware of the point above, the participation
on the reform will be substantially lower simply due to the lack of
political support. This will harm the success of the reform regardless
of the first point coming true or not.
14See for example Bo¨rsch-Supan; Ko¨ke, Winter (2004).
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As a conclusion, we think that it is premature to implement the current
reform and additional discussion about the reform would be desirable. A
reform should bring more certainty about the future of the new system which
is necessary to guarantee its success. We think that the Czech pension system
reform will follow other pension reforms in the CEE region and will be either
cancelled or substantially changed within a decade.
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Conclusions
In the introduction of this thesis we have outlined three main points of this
paper - problem identification, theory presentation, solution implementation.
We argued using the example of the Czech Republic that the main prob-
lem of the current pension system is the unsustainability of the current
PAYG scheme. This scheme has to be reformed for more reasons. Firstly ac-
cording to demographic prognosis the scheme is going to generate substantial
deficits over the future decades and therefore it is not financially sustainable.
Moreover, the current pension system is also very vulnerable due to low risk
diversification.
In the theoretical part of the thesis we outlined the Pareto efficiency
discussion. We have shown that if certain conditions are met, the pension
system reform might be welfare improving for all generations. On the other
hand, we did not recommend a switch to a pure FF scheme, because on one
hand, it would not solve the risk diversification problem and, on the other
hand, the PAYG scheme is vital in many areas, for example for the state
social policy. We have to be aware of the fact that speaking about any social
policy we cannot usually strive for the first-best solution, but we have to
look for the second -best solution (for this, see Barr, Diamond (2008)). We
also discussed the political economy of the pension reform and we identified
variables which influence the reform the most. The key variable was influence
groups. These groups, regardless of the optimality of the reform, follow their
partial interests and it is vital for the future of the reform to harmonize these
interests as far as possible.
In the last third of the thesis we presented pension system reforms made in
countries very similar to the Czech Republic - from economic, historical and
cultural point of view. We examined their setting, their implementation and
also their evolution and found out that the basic setting of all these reforms
was very similar. We also found out that these new pension systems did not
have a long duration. Reforms in all discussed countries were if not cancelled
than heavily re-reformed. The main cause for this was the indecisiveness
and unwillingness of the political representation to finish the transformation
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of the pension system. At the end we have discussed the current Czech
pension system reform. Some changes have been made there, compared to the
other previously discussed reforms such as the second pillar being voluntary.
Unfortunately, we see the same mistakes in the Czech pension reform as we
have seen before. Political support of the pension system reform, which we
have identified as the most crucial point of a pension system reform, is weak
and we do not think that the new Czech pension system will last much longer
than the other new systems in the CEE region.
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Appendix A
A.1 Derivation of the Government Debt from
Section 3.1
The government debt is equal to
DBt = (1 + r)
t−1 ·N0 · bPAY G ·
[
1 + n+ (n− r) ·
t−1∑
τ=1
(
1 + n
1 + r
)τ]
.
We know that a sum of a geometric sequence can be written as follows
n∑
i=1
a · qi−1 = a · 1− q
n
1− q .
The sum in the government debt term can be rewritten
t−1∑
τ=1
(
1 + n
1 + r
)τ
=
t−1∑
τ=1
a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 + n
1 + r
·
(
1 + n
1 + r
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
q
τ−1
.
And therefore
t−1∑
τ=1
(
1 + n
1 + r
)τ
=
1 + n
1 + r
· 1−
(
1+n
1+r
)t−1
1− (1+n
1+r
) = 1 + n
1 + r
·
− (1+n)t−1−(1+r)t−1
(1+r)t−1
−n−r
1+r
=
=
(1 + n) · [(1 + n)t−1 − (1 + r)t−1]
(n− r) · (1 + r)t−1 .
After substituting this term in the government debt equation we get
DBt = (1 + r)
t−1 ·N0 · bPAY G·
·(1 + n) · (1 + r)
t−1 + (1 + n) · [(1 + n)t−1 − (1 + r)t−1]
(1 + r)t−1
= N0·bPAY G·(1+n)t.
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A.2 Propositions 1-4 from Section 3.2
From the following condition
Pt+1 − (1 + r) · b · wt · lt = P PAY Gt+1 − (1 + r) · bPAY G · wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt ,
we compute dPt+1
db
using the implicit function theorem. Let’s set
f(Pt+1, b) = Pt+1 − (1 + r) · b · wt · lt.
Then
∂f(·)
∂Pt+1
= 1− (1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt
∂Pt+1
,
∂f(·)
∂b
= −(1 + r) · wt · lt − (1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt
∂b
.
Assume that
∂f(·)
∂Pt+1
6= 0.
Then
dPt+1
db
= −
∂f(·)
∂b
∂f(·)
∂Pt+1
=
(1 + r) · wt · lt + (1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt∂b
1− (1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt∂Pt+1
.
Differentiating the indirect utility function Vt(·) with respect to b we get
dVt
db
=
∂Vt
∂b
+
∂Vt
∂Pt+1
· dPt+1
db
.
Combining this with Roy’s identity
∂Vt
∂b
= −(1 + r) · wt · lt · ∂Vt
∂Pt+1
and substituting the result for dPt+1
db
, we get
dVt
db
=
(
−(1 + r) · wt · lt +
(1 + r) · wt · lt + (1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt∂b
1− (1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt∂Pt+1
)
· ∂Vt
∂Pt+1
.
We can rearrange the last term as follows
dVt
db
=
−(1 + r) · wt · lt ·
[
1− (1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt∂Pt+1
]
+ (1 + r) · wt · lt+
1− (1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt∂Pt+1
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+(1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt∂b · ∂Vt
∂Pt+1
=
=
[(1 + r) · wt · lt] ·
[
(1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt∂Pt+1
]
+ (1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt∂b
1− (1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt∂Pt+1
· ∂Vt
∂Pt+1
.
So finally we get
dVt
db
=
(1 + r) · b · wt
1− (1 + r) · b · wt · ∂lt∂Pt+1
·
[
(1 + r) · wt · lt · ∂lt
∂Pt+1
+
∂lt
∂b
]
· ∂Vt
∂Pt+1
.
We know that
∂Vt
∂Pt+1
> 0,
∂lt
∂Pt+1
< 0.
The second is due to the fact that leisure, i.e. (1− lt), is a normal good in our
model. Because the utility function U(·) is strictly quasi-concave, it holds
∂lt
∂b
< 0.
Therefore we have
b > 0⇒ dVt
db
< 0,
b < 0⇒ dVt
db
> 0.
This results in b∗ = 0 being an optimum which proves the Proposition 1.
In case a generation is a loser, the condition b∗ = 0 would imply P ∗t+1 < 0
(see the condition (3.7)), which is not possible. Therefore b must be increased
until we get P ∗t+1 = 0. This proves the Proposition 2.
The proof of the Proposition 3 follows from the previous propositions
and the condition (3.7). All these three propositions together imply the
Proposition 4.
QED
A.3 Pareto Improving Transition from Sec-
tion 3.2
There is bt > b
∗
t , because from the Proposition 2 we know that for a generation
t which is a loser there is b∗t such that
Vt (b
∗
t , 0) > V
(
bPAY G, P PAY Gt+1
)
.
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Therefore it is possible to find bt (by taxing the labour a little more) such
that
V (bt, 0) = V
(
bPAY G, P PAY Gt+1
)
.
It is also straightforward to show that εt > 0. From the Proposition 2 and
the condition (3.7) we know that the following holds
b∗t · wt · lt = bPAY G · wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt −
P PAY Gt+1
1 + r
.
And therefore from
bt · wt · lt = bPAY G · wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt −
P PAY Gt+1
1 + r
+ εt · wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt
immediately follows εt > 0. From the first constraint of the maximization
problem (3.6) we have
D1 = P
PAY G
1 − b1 · w1 · l1.
The equation (3.8) together with P PAY G2 = b
PAY G · wPAY G2 · lPAY G2 gives
D1 = b
PAY G · w
PAY G
2 · lPAY G2
1 + r
− ε1 · wPAY G1 · lPAY G1 .
For the government debt D2 we have
D2 = (1 + r) ·D1 − b2 · w2 · l2
and
D2 = b
PAY G · w
PAY G
3 · lPAY G3
1 + r
− (1+r) ·ε1 ·wPAY G1 · lPAY G1 −ε2 ·wPAY G2 · lPAY G2 .
For the government debt DT we therefore have
DT = b
PAY G · w
PAY G
T+1 · lPAY GT+1
1 + r
−
T∑
t=1
(1 + r)T−t · εt · wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt
and
DT =
wPAY GT+1 · lPAY GT+1
1 + r
·
(
bPAY G −
T∑
t=1
(1 + r)T+1−t · εt · w
PAY G
t · lPAY Gt
wPAY GT+1 · lPAY GT+1
)
.
We have assumed that the interest rate exceeds the growth rate, i.e.
(1 + r) >
wPAY Gt+1 · lPAY Gt+1
wPAY Gt · lPAY Gt
,
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and therefore it holds
(1 + r)T+1−t · w
PAY G
t · lPAY Gt
wPAY GT+1 · lPAY GT+1
> 1.
In the beginning of this proof we have shown that εt > 0. Therefore there
exists a finite T for which it holds that
T∑
t=1
(1 + r)T+1−t · εt · w
PAY G
t · lPAY Gt
wPAY GT+1 · lPAY GT+1
≥ bPAY G.
This shows that the government debt can be paid off in finite time T .
QED
A.4 Derivation of the Model from the Section
4.2
We solve the following maximization problem:
max
s,l
Ut = α · ln c1t + β · ln c2t+1 + ln (1− lt)
subject to
c1t =
(
1− bPAY Gt
) · lt − st,
c2t+1 = (1 + rt) · st + P PAY Gt+1 .
We substitute in the U(·) for c1t and c2t+1:
max
s,l
Ut = α·ln
[(
1− bPAY Gt
) · lt − st]+β·ln [(1 + rt) · st + P PAY Gt+1 ]+ln (1−lt).
From here we derive the first order conditions:
∂Ut
∂st
=
−α
(1− bPAY Gt ) · lt − st
+
β · (1 + rt)
(1 + rt) · st + P PAY Gt+1
= 0,
∂Ut
∂lt
=
α · (1− bPAY Gt )
(1− bPAY Gt ) · lt − st
− 1
1− lt = 0.
From the second condition we have
st = (1− bPAY Gt ) · lt − α · (1− bPAY Gt ) · (1− lt). (A.1)
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Substituting this for st into the first first order condition we get
α
(1− bPAY Gt ) · lt − (1− bPAY Gt ) · lt + α · (1− bPAY Gt ) · (1− lt)
=
=
β · (1 + rt)
(1 + rt) · [(1− bPAY Gt ) · lt − α · (1− bPAY Gt ) · (1− lt)] + P PAY Gt+1
.
From here rearranging this equation we get the labour supply function the
member of the young generation would choose
l∗t =
α + β
1 + α + β
− P
PAY G
t+1
(1 + α + β) · (1 + rt) · (1− bPAY Gt )
. (A.2)
We rearrange the equation (A.1) and get
st = (1− bPAY Gt ) · [−α + (1 + α) · lt] .
We substitute for lt from the equation (A.2):
st = (1−bPAY Gt )·
{
−α + [1 + α]
[
α + β
1 + α + β
− P
PAY G
t
(1 + α + β) · (1 + rt) · (1− bPAY Gt )
]}
.
From here rearranging this equation we get the savings function the member
of the young generation would choose
s∗t =
β · (1− bPAY Gt )
1 + α + β
− (1 + α) · P
PAY G
t+1
(1 + α + β) · (1 + rt) . (A.3)
The member of the old generation given the equations (A.2) and (A.3)
maximizes his pension with respect to the contribution rate bPAY Gt :
max
bPAYGt
P PAY Gt = b
PAY G
t · lt · (1 + nt).
The first order condition is
∂P PAY Gt
∂bPAY Gt
= lt · (1 + nt) + bPAY Gt · (1 + nt) ·
∂lt
bPAY Gt
= 0.
Rearranging this equation we get
∂lt
∂bPAY Gt
· b
PAY G
t
lt
= −1. (A.4)
From the equation (A.2) we compute
∂l∗t
∂bPAY Gt
=
−P PAY Gt+1 · (1 + α + β) · (1 + rt)
[(1 + α + β) · (1 + rt) · (1− bPAY Gt )]2
=
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=
−P PAY Gt+1
(1 + α + β) · (1 + rt) · (1− bPAY Gt )2
.
We plug this into (A.4):
−P PAY Gt+1
(1 + α + β) · (1 + rt) · (1− bPAY Gt )2
· b
PAY G
t
lt
= −1 (A.5)
−bPAY Gt · lt · (1 + nt)
(1 + α + β) · (1 + rt) · (1− bPAY Gt )2
· b
PAY G
t
lt
= −1
From here we get
bPAY Gt = (1− bPAY Gt ) ·
√
(1 + α + β) · (1 + rt)
1 + nt
.
After several rearrangements we get the equation (4.1).
In order to derive the equation (4.2) we use the equation (A.5) once more
and substitute l∗t from (A.2) for lt:
−P PAY Gt+1
(1 + α + β) · (1 + rt) · (1− bPAY Gt )2
· b
PAY G
t
α+β
1+α+β
− PPAYGt+1
(1+α+β)·(1+rt)·(1−bPAYGt )
= −1
P PAY Gt ·
(
1 +
1− bPAY Gt
bPAY Gt
)
=
(1− bPAY Gt )2
bPAY Gt
· (α + β) · (1 + rt)
P PAY Gt = (1− bPAY Gt )2 · (α + β) · (1 + rt)
Substituting bPAY G
∗
from (4.1) into this equation leads to
P PAY G
∗
=
 1
1 +
√
(1+α+β)·(1+r)
n
2 · (α + β) · (1 + r),
which gives the equation (4.2).
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Abstracts
This thesis aims at pension system reform. On the example of the Czech Re-
public it examines the current pension system and identifies its weaknesses.
The paper investigates both theoretical concepts of reforming a pension sys-
tem and their implementation. It assess recent pension system reforms in
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and based on this evaluation it comments
on the upcomming Czech reform. Das Thema dieser Magisterarbeit ist die
Reform des Altersvorsorgesystems. Am Beispiel der Tschechischen Repub-
lik werden das gegenwa¨rtige System und seine Schwa¨chen untersucht. Diese
Arbeit studiert einerseits theoretische Konzepte der Reform des Altersvor-
sorgesystems, aber auch ihre Implementierung. Gegenwa¨rtige Reformen in
Ungarn, Polen und in der Slowakei werden bewertet und entsprechende
Empfehlungen fu¨r die tschechische Reform hergeleitet.
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